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I. INTRODUCTION
The long-running controversy over salmon migration in the
Columbia River reached another milestone in 2011, when Federal
District Court Judge James A. Redden once again rejected the
federal biological opinion (BiOp) governing hydroelectric
operations that adversely affect endangered salmon.' This
rejection marked the third time that Judge Redden found the
government's effort to protect salmon inadequate to avoid
jeopardy to the listed species.2 This time, however, instead of
remanding the entire BiOp, he bifurcated his opinion, allowing
the proposed ten-year BiOp to control river operations through
2013 but ordering a new one in 2014.3 Judge Redden then
withdrew from the legal controversy he had judged for a decade
and, at age 82, retired from the case. 4
Despite Judge Redden's prudent oversight, the fate of listed
Columbia River salmon remains very much in peril, as powerful
federal agencies led by the Bonneville Power Administration
continue to resist the fundamental changes to the hydroelectric
system that both Judge Redden and his predecessor suggested
were necessary.5 As a result, wild runs of Columbia Basin salmon
* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. For
comments on drafts of this article, we thank Ed Brunet, HenryJ. Casey Professor of Law at
Lewis & Clark Law School; Dan Mensher, Clinical Professor of Law and Staff Attorney at
the Earthrise Law Center, Lewis & Clark Law School; Dan Rohlf, Professor of Law and Of
Counsel, Earthrise Law Center, Lewis & Clark Law School; and Josh Smith, Project
Attorney at Earthjustice and formerly ajudicial clerk forJudgeJames Redden.
**J.D. 2012 cum laude,Lewis & Clark Law School; Editor in Chief, Animal Law, 2011-2012.
1. Nat'4 Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1121 (D.
Or. 2011).
2. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012) (establishing a duty to avoid jeopardy to listed
species); infra notes 172-94 234-63, 315-43 and accompanying text (discussing Judge
Redden's rejection of the government's 2000, 2004, and 2008/2010 BiOps).
3. See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
4. See Scott Learn, judge James Redden to Step Down After a Decade on the Northwest's

Biggest Lawsuit, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 23, 2011, http://www.oregonlive.com/
environment/index.ssf/201 1/1 1/federaljudge james a_redden_t.html.
5. Judge Redden's last opinion ordered a revised government BiOp that would
"consider[] whether more aggressive action, such as dam removal and/or additional flow
augmentation and reservoir modifications are necessary to avoid jeopardy." Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1130. Recently, speaking
extrajudicially, Redden suggested that the long-term solution to the salmon saga was the
removal of four lower Snake River dams, which are the Ice Harbor, Lower Monumental,
Little Goose and Lower Granite: "'I think we need to take those dams down.... I've never
ordered (federal agencies) or even tried to order them that you gotta take those dams
down. But I have urged them to do some work on the dams (to improve prospects for
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are now just half of what they were thirty years ago, when the 1980
federal Northwest Power Act called for restoring the salmon runs
and treating salmon migration and hydropower generation on a
coequal basis.6 This failure to restore salmon runs has occurred
despite the cumulative expenditure of some $10 billion. 7
This astonishingly poor record of implementing what is
generally thought to be the nation's most protective
environmental law8 is due largely to the federal government's
persistent unwillingness to significantly change hydroelectric
operations or reconfigure the system to benefit migrating salmon.
Instead, the government has engaged in a kind of "bait and
switch" approach of investing heavily in habitat rehabilitation,

salmon), and they have done (so).'" Scott Learn, judge James Redden: 'We Need to Take Those
(Snake River) Dams Doirn,' THE OREGONIAN, Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.oregonlive.com/
environment/index.ssf/2012/04/judge-james redden-weneed_to.html; see also Brooklyn
Baptiste, Balancing Power Needs and the Environment: What James Redden Says on Salmon

http://
2012,
04,
May
OREGONIAN,
THE
Matters,
Still
Recovery
www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/05/balancing-power-needs and_the.html
("Redden's comments reminded the tribe how much it respected his integrity and
fearlessness .... Judges like Redden, acting with independence given to them by the U.S.
Constitution, provide a measure of confidence that decisions won't be based on political
calculation or power, but on the requirements of existing law. Redden's courage was
evident throughout 10 years of handling an extraordinarily complex lawsuit with
unwavering independence and care.").
Judge Redden's predecessor, Judge Malcolm Marsh, voiced similar sentiments many years
earlier. In striking down the government's first attempt to conform Columbia River
operations to the requirements of the ESA in 1994, Judge Marsh stated that small,
incremental steps would not satisfy the ESA because "the process is seriously,
'significantly,' flawed because it is too heavily geared towards a status quo that has allowed
all forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit situation . . . when the situation literally
cries out for a major overhaul." Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries
Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994). See infra notes 134-47 and accompanying text
for a discussion ofJudge Marsh's first review of a hydropower BiOp.
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 839; Nw. Res. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Nw. Power Planning Council, 35
F.3d 1371, 1378 (9th Cir. 1994) (interpreting the statute as "making fish and wildlife a 'coequal partner' with the hydropower industry"). See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying
text for a discussion of current obstacles to Pacific salmon's survival.
7. See Michael C. Blumm, The Real Story Behind the Columbia Basin Salmon Debacle: Dam
Peservation Under the Endangered Species Act, 41 ENvrL. L. 1363 (2011) (reviewing STEVEN
HAWLEY, RECOVERING A LosT RIVER: REMOVING DAMs, REWILDING SALMON, REVITALIZING

COMMUNITIES 129, 138 (2011))..
8. According to Professor Cheever, "[a]lthough it does not protect biological
diversity as such, the Endangered Species Act is one of the world's most powerful species
preservation laws and has proved a potent tool for stopping, or at least delaying, projects
that create a significant, readily identifiable threat to biological diversity." Federico
Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A Nero Way of Thinking About the Endangered Species Act, 23
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3-4 (1996).
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about which Judge Redden expressed "serious reservations." 9 So,
despite a mountain of paperwork and several rounds of failed
BiOps, the sorry salmon saga will continue for another round of
BiOps that will be reviewed by a different federal judge. 0 Judicial
calls for a "major overhaul" in system operations, first heard nearly
two decades ago," may continue, along with claims that the federal
government is practicing deception, or worse, in its attempts to
implement the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 12
Judge James Redden stepped into this controversy a decade
ago, when he succeeded Judge Malcolm Marsh of the United
States District Court of Oregon.IsJudge Redden proceeded to find
the government's 2000 BiOp inadequate, 4 and he did so again
concerning its 2004 BiOp.' 5 Even after the government managed
to buy off several of the plaintiffs for $10 billion over ten years,' 6
9. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1129-30
(noting that while habitat improvement "is vital to recovery," Judge Redden was troubled
by the lack of scientific support for the government's salmon survival predictions, citing
skepticism expressed by independent scientists).
10. Judge Michael Simon, appointed to the bench by President Obama and
confirmed by the Senate in 2011, will replace Judge Redden. Notice of Judicial
Reassignment, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2011), ECF No. 1882.
11. See Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886,
900 (D. Or. 1994).
12. See Michael C. Blumm, EricaJ. Thorson &Joshua D. Smith, Practiced at the Art of
Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery tinder the Endangered Species Act, 36

ENvrL. L. 709 (2006) [hereinafter PracticingDeception]. Steven Hawley has suggested that
the startlingly poor results per dollar expended are due to "a skillfully directed symphony
of public relations scams, filthy politics, and crooked science." HAWLEY, supra note 7, at
144.
13. Judge Redden was appointed to the federal bench by President Carter in 1979
and assumed senior status in 1995. Prior to his appointment to the bench, he graduated
from Boston College Law School, practiced law for seventeen years in Medford, Oregon,
where the federal courthouse is named for him, served for six years in the Oregon House
as a Democrat, and was both the state's Treasurer (1973-1976) and Attorney General
(1977-1980). See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Redden, James Anthony, http://www.fjc.gov/
servlet/nGetinfo?jid=1977&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
14. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1213-14
(D. Or. 2003). See infra notes 172-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge
Redden's rejection of the 2000 BiOp.
15. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23RE, 2005 WL 1278878, at *7 (D. Or. May 26, 2005). See infra notes 234-63 and
accompanying text for a discussion ofJudge Redden's rejection of the 2004 BiOp.
16. See 2008 COLUMBIA BASIN FISH ACCORDS MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE THREE TREATY TRIBES AND FCRPS ACTION AGENCIES (May 2, 2008), available at

http://www.critfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/moa.pdf (agreement between tribes
and federal agencies guaranteeing the tribes money for restoration of salmon habitat);
Rocky Barker, Salmon Decision Makes BPA Customers Pay Twice, IDAHO STATESMAN BLOG

(Aug. 4, 2011, 8:27 AM), http://voices.idahostatesman.com/2011/08/03/rockybarker/
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he was unwilling to approve a BiOp in 2011 that would have
ten years
of litigation-free
the government
granted
implementation.17 Because Judge Redden provided a skeptical
review of government claims of expertise, gave credence to
scientific sources critical of the government's claims, and was
apparently unwilling to allow the government to prevail by
purchasing the support of much of the opposition, 8 he was
perhaps the archetypical federal judge in public law litigation, as
portrayed long ago in Harvard Professor Abram Chayes' article The
9 Judge Redden thus leaves
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation.1
behind giant shoes that will be difficult to fill: he demonstrated a
willingness to stand up to virtually all the most powerful interests
in the region involved in hydropower generation, navigation, and
trade on the Columbia River, some of the most formidable lobbies
in the Pacific Northwest,20 to say nothing of the federal agencies
urging him to defer to their expertise, including the agency
responsible for ESA implementation. 2 1
salmon decision-makesbpacustomers._pay_twice (discussing the economic ramifications
of the $10 billion Columbia Accords plan for restoring salmon). After the $10 billion
agreement, three tribes withdrew from the BiOp litigation, leaving only Oregon, the Nez
Perce Tribe, and environmental groups as plaintiffs.
17. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117,
1128 (D. Or. 2011); infra notes 315-43 and accompanying text (discussing the 2011 BiOp
decision).
18. See, e.g., infra note 292 and accompanying text.
19. See Abram Chayes, The Role of thejudge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.

1281 (1976) (suggesting that in public law litigation, judges should play a more active role
in shaping of claims, discovery, interparty negotiations, the issuance of decrees, and
monitoring of litigants' compliance with the court's orders).
20. Defendant-intervenors have included the states of Idaho and Montana, as well as
influential groups such as the Northwest Requirement Utilities, the Pacific Northwest
Generating Cooperatives, the Industrial Customers of Northwest Utilities, Alcoa, Inc., the
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, the Northwest Irrigation
Utilities, the Public Power Council, the BPA Customer Group, the Washington State Farm
Bureau Federation, the Franklin County Farm Bureau Federation, the Grant County Farm
Bureau Federation, the Clarkson Golf & Country Club, the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, and
the Inland Ports and Navigation Group. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries
Serv., 524 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2007); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'Il Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
CV 01-640-RE, 2005 WL 1278878 (D. Or. May 26 2006); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l
Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Or. 2003).
21. See generally IacticingDeception, supra note 12. The ESA implementation agency in

the case of Columbia Basin salmon is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (sometimes referred to as NOAA-Fisheries or the National Marine
Fisheries Service). The surprising transformation of this agency from a salmon protector
to a hydropower defender of status-quo operations is portrayed in Michael C. Blumm &
Greg Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act: Lessons from the Columbia Basin, 74
WASH. L. REV. 519, 591-92 (1999) [hereinafter Salmon and the EndangeredSpeciesAct].
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This article discussesJudge Redden's review of Columbia Basin
BiOps over the last decade. Part II supplies background on the
clash between hydropower operations and salmonids, including a
brief overview of the ESA. Part III provides an overview of the
concepts of "managerial judging" and public law litigation and
discusses the judge's important role in overseeing the hydropower
BiOps. Part IV reviews judicial oversight of the hydropower BiOps
preceding Judge Redden. Part V evaluates Judge Redden's review
of the 2000 BiOp-a product of the Clinton Administrationwhich was his first opportunity to examine the federal
government's approach to avoiding species jeopardy for listed
salmon, as required by the ESA. Part VI considers the judge's
evaluation of the ensuing 2004 BiOp-this one advanced by the
Bush Administration-which the judge also found wanting. Part
VII focuses on Judge Redden's consideration of the 2008 BiOporiginally proposed by the Bush Administration and reissued with
only minor modifications by the Obama Administration in 2010which he concluded also failed to satisfy the ESA. Judge Redden's
final decision is perhaps the most telling, for it illustrates the
importance of the role that the federal judiciary can play in
combating the interest-group politics that is so evident in the
Columbia Basin salmon saga. Part VIII reviews the effects of Judge
Redden's hands-on approach to oversight of the hydropower
BiOps on remand. The article concludes by suggesting that the
fate of the imperiled Columbia Basin salmon runs rests uneasily in
the hands ofJudge Redden's successor, as it is hardly clear that the
skepticism that Redden so ably deployed will continue.
II. THE CLASH BETWEEN HYDROPOWER AND SALMON
The salmon runs in Columbia River Basin were once the
largest in the world, 22 prompting Meriwether Lewis to assert in
1805 that "the multitudes of this fish are almost inconceivable." 2 3
However, beginning in the 1930s, 24 water project development
22. See Michael C. Blumm, River Basin Survey: Columbia River Basin, in 4 WATERS AND

WATER RIGHTS 2 (Amy L. Kelley ed., 3d ed. Matthew Bender 2011) [hereinafter Columbia
River Basin].
23.

See BLAINE HARDEN, A RIVER LOST: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE COLUMBIA 63

(1996).
24. Even before dams lined the Columbia River, overfishing facilitated by new
technologies and increased populations along the river drastically reduced the size of
salmon runs. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 11 (observing that novel fishing
practices began to deplete salmon runs by the 1880s, and that "[t] he 1883 chinook catch
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severely compromised salmon 25 migratory paths. 26 To the great
detriment of salmon, by the late twentieth century, 150 damS27 had
harnessed Columbia Basin streamflows in the name of flood
control, navigation, irrigation, and hydropower, 28 creating the
largest interconnected hydroelectric system in the world."
The world's largest salmon runs did not fare well as a result of
the development and operation of that system, which changed the
very essence of the Columbia River Basin. In effect, the dams
turned a mighty river that flows 1,200 miles and drains an area
larger than France" into a series of large reservoirs.31 Now,
of forty-three million pounds has never again been matched"). However, it is dams and
other aspects of water development on the river that have pushed many populations of
salmon to the brink of extinction. See MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A
LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 88 (2002)
[hereinafter SACRIFICING THE SALMON] ("Although it is true that salmon habitat has been
damaged by logging, grazing, and mining, the predominant cause of the decline of most
Columbia Basin salmon runs is the development and operation of the largest
interconnected hydroelectric system in the world.").
25. This article refers to "salmon" throughout, but the threatened and endangered
species that are its focus consist of both salmon and steelhead, a group technically
(Aug. 15, 2011),
Salmon Populations, NOAA
as "salmonids."
referenced
primary
A
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/ESA-Salmon-Listings/Salmon-Populations/.
difference between steelhead and salmon is that, unlike salmon, steelhead do not die after
spawning and therefore may navigate between the.ocean and spawning grounds more
than once. Where Do Salmon Go in the Ocean?, NOAA (June 16, 2011),
http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/faq/fishfaq2d.html.
26. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON supra note 24, at 35; see also Where Do Salmon Go in
the Ocean?,supra note 25, at 4.
27. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 24, at 87.
28. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 141.
29. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 24, at 88. The Columbia River Basin
produces more than forty percent of the nation's hydropower. See id at 87. For a recent
suggestion that the national hydropower capacity could be enhanced by employing
concepts of "the normative river" and adaptive management to establish and adjust
ecosystem maintenance flows on major rivers, which would reduce or eliminate costs of
increasing hydroelectric generation, see Dan Tarlock, Hydro Law and the Future of
Hydroelectric Power Generation in the United States, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1723, 1756, 1764-466
(2012).
30. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 24, at 87 (identifying the Columbia
River as "the defining natural resource of the Pacific Northwest," and observing that
"[t] he Columbia is the West's biggest River system, with the force to pierce the Cascades.
The Columbia has seven times the flow of the Colorado, two hundred times that of the Rio
Grande").
31. See HARDEN, supra note 23, at 71 (referring to the water between dams on the
Columbia River as "sluggish and tepid reservoirs"); Don Gayton, "Ghost River": The
Columbia, 1 B.C.J. ECOSYSTEMS & MGMT. 2, 2 (2001) (referring to the Columbia River as
the "Ghost River," and asserting that his "culture ... has chosen to turn the Columbia
into a series of industrial reservoirs (to call them 'lakes' is a grievous misuse of the word)
and then play God with its salmonid ecology").
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although previously traversing 109 waterfalls, the Columbia River
flows freely in only two places.32 As author William Dietrich has
maintained, the Columbia "is a river not so much transformed as
seemingly invented. If you want to see how America dreamed at
the height of the American Century, come to the Columbia."3 3 But
the manifestation of this dream came at an extremely high cost:
chinook salmon and steelhead are now extinct throughout more
than fifty percent of their historic range east of the Cascades, and
just two percent of the Columbia Basin's watersheds have strong
salmon runs.34 Of historical salmon losses in the Columbia Basin,
approximately eighty percent can be attributed to hydropower
development and operation.35
A. Minimizing and Compensatingfor Salmon Mortality

Transforming rivers in the Columbia River Basin into what are
essentially reservoirs has had numerous deleterious effects on
salmon populations. The dams increase water temperatures,36
cause greater predation of juvenile salmon,37 and significantly
lengthen the time it takes for juvenile salmon to migrate
downriver, which is problematic because salmon are biologically
programmed to develop into saltwater animals during a particular
timeline as they travel, preparing themselves for survival in the
ocean.38 Further, dams present serious physical obstacles to salmon
32. Daniel

J. Rohlf, Lessons from the Columbia River Basin:Follow the Blueprint but Avoid

the Barriers, 19 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 195, 195-96 (2006) ("The
Columbia itself, which once raged over 109 major falls and rapids, now runs free in only
two places: one in the United States and one in Canada.").
33. WILLIAM DIETRICH, NORTHWEST PASSAGE: THE GREAT COLUMBIA RIVER 46

(1995); see also HARDEN, supra note 23, at 75 ("Indeed, it is silly to pretend that the
Columbia is a river in the sense that Lewis and Clark understood it. The river was killed
more than sixty years ago and was reborn as plumbing.").
34. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 24, at 88.

35. Am. Rivers v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. Civ. 96-384-MA, 1997 WL
33797790, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997) (reporting an estimate made by the National Marine
Fisheries Service). For a detailed discussion of the sharp decline in salmon species in the
twentieth century, see Salmon and the EndangeredSpecies Act, supra note 21, at 525-48.
36. See Craig N. Johnston, Salmon and Water Temperature: Taking Endangered Species
Seriously in EstablishingWater Quality Standards,33 ENvrL. L. 151, 153 (2003) (asserting that

increasing water temperatures contribute significantly to salmonids' decline).
37. See HARDEN, supra note 23, at 71 (reporting that salmon going through turbines
are stunned, making them easier prey).
38. See id ("[A]s they swim downstream, juvenile[] [salmon] undergo physical
changes that allow them to breathe in saltwater. The timing of this transformation is
delicate and easily disrupted. Before there were dams, young fish could reach the sea in
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attempting to navigate both up and downriver.39
Those managing the hydroelectric system in the Columbia
Basin have attempted to minimize or compensate for the harm
dams cause to salmon populations, but their efforts have had only
mixed success. 40 For example, some dams have been equipped
with ladders, locks, traps, elevators, and bypass canals; however,
those measures have not reversed the overall decline of Columbia
Basin salmon runs.4 ' In fact, despite bypass devices, up to ninetyone percent of juvenile salmon face mortality while traveling
downriver.42 Since reducing the juvenile mortality rate is key to
recovering listed salmon species, changing dam operations could
increase salmon survival rates-but that would cause some power
losses.45 Consequently, to prevent diminishing power production,
the government has chosen to gather juvenile salmon into trucks
or barges for transport downriver as a primary method of avoiding

less than a month. In slackwater, it can take two to three months.").
39. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 30; see also HARDEN, supranote 23, at 71
("The problem with salmon actually swimming in the dammed-up river is that, sooner or
later, they have to brave a turbine. A Snake River salmon has to pass through eight sets of
turbines, four in the lower Snake, four in the middle and lower Columbia. Each turbine
on the river kills between [ten] and [fifteen] percent of the fingerlingjuvenile salmon that
get sucked into it. Turbines do not puree these small salmon, rather they kill by creating
violent pressure changes that can explode a salmori's swim bladder. The combined effect
of eight dams kills at least three of every four young salmon migrating from Idaho to the
sea. Salmon not killed [by the dams] are often stunned, making them easy prey for
seagulls and predator fish who hang out behind McNary and other dams.").
40. See Columbia River Basin, supranote 22, at 31-34 (discussing attempts to minimize
salmon mortality caused by hydroelectric operations, but asserting that salmon
populations have continued to decline).
41. See id. at 31 ("Bonneville Dam, completed in 1938, included an elaborate system
of fish ladders, locks, traps, elevators, and bypass canals to permit upstream migrating
adult salmon to ascend the height of the dam and reach their spawning grounds
upstream. However, such bypass devices were not feasible at every dam, and some that
were built proved unsuccessful. Also, adult fish ladders do not aid juvenile fish migrating
downstream, which suffer mortalities due to turbine passage, delay due to low water flows,
and predation in reservoirs."); John M. Volkman, How Do You Learnfrom a River? Managing
Uncertainly in Species Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 719, 726-27 (1999) ("[T]he

problem of fish passage at high dams proved to be insurmountable.").
42. See PracticingDeception, supra note 12, at 728 (citing THE INDEP. SCIENTIFIC GRP.,
RETURN TO THE RIVER 235, 299 (2000)).

43. See id.at 728 ("Dam operators, favoring mitigation that interferes minimally with
power production, support barging and trucking salmon and maintain that the efficacy of
the transportation program has not yet been undermined by clear scientific proof and
continuously declining salmon runs. This successful shifting of the burden of proof to
those advocating for salmon-in this case being forced to prove a nearly impossible
negative-is commonplace in Columbia Basin salmon/hydropower tradeoffs.").
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salmon mortality caused by the dams."
Another attempt to mitigate the damage caused by Columbia
Basin dams has been to compensate for the loss of salmon runs by
supplementing stocks with tens of millions of hatchery fish each
year.45 The result is that hatchery salmon have now largely
replaced Columbia Basin wild salmon:4@ indeed, some salmon runs
now consist of more than eighty percent hatchery fish.47 The
roughly 130 million hatchery fish released every year48 do not
perform well in the wild,49 and they have damaged salmon
populations by transmitting disease, outcompeting wild salmon for
food, jeopardizing the integrity of wild populations through
interbreeding, and sometimes preying on smaller wild salmon."
44. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 46. Many states, tribes, scientists, and
salmon advocates oppose transport and favor some combination of flow improvements
and spill, pointing to statistics indicating that transport causes more juvenile mortality than
in-river migration. See PracticingDeception, supranote 12, at 729.
45. See HARDEN, supra note 23, at 74 ("[Sltate and federal fish hatcheries on the
Columbia-Snake system seed the rivers with tens of millions of [hatchery fish] throughout
the spring and summer."); Practicing Deception, supra note 12, at 724 (stating that salmon
populations "are heavily supported by hatchery fish").
46. See Volkman, supra note 41, at 727 (referring to the introduction of hatchery fish
as a "mechanistic approach[]" and explaining that, "We assumed that if we did enough of
these things we could fix the problem. This idea has appeal in a political system that is
disinclined to push restrictions on humans").
47. See Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T. Putnam, Imposing judicial Restraints on the

"Art of Deception": The Courts Cast a Skeptical Eye on Columbia Basin Salmon Restoration Efforts,
38 ENvrL. L. 47, 69 (2008) [hereinafter ImposingfJudicialRestraints].

48. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 102.
49. According to one article, "[flisheries biologists have known for years that
hatchery-reared individuals show substantial deficits in virtually all aspects of their
behaviour." Culum Brown & Rachel L. Day, The Future of Stock Enhancements: Lessons for
Hatchery Practicefrom Conservation Biology, 3 FISH & FISHERIES 79, 82 (2002). For example,

foraging and predator evasion behaviors are learned from prior experience, but for
hatchery fish, raised in unnatural conditions, those behaviors are "poorly developed and
insufficient to cope with life in the wild." Id. at 83.Further, the wild fish, with which
hatchery fish interbreed, inherit the hatchery fish's poor performance in the wild.
According to one 1999 study, statistics "imply that supplementation (wherein wild fish
interbreed with hatchery fish of reduced fitness) will reduce the productivity of naturally
spawning populations, and often may compromise conservation objectives," and a decline
in survival "suggests that the fitness of the next generation would be low even before
interbreeding with more hatchery fish, and that continuous supplementation should
progressively diminish the productivity of the naturally spawning population." R. R.
Reisenbichler & S. P. Rubin, Cenetic Changesfrom Artificial Propagation of Pacific Salmon Affect
the Productivity and Viability of Supplemented Populations, 56J. MARINE Scl. 459, 464 (1999).
50. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 33; Imposing judicial Restraints, supra
note 47, at 69 n.129 (citingJudge Cougenhour as stating in Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, No.
CVO6-0483-JCC, 2007 WL 1795036, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2007), that hatchery fish
"'prey upon smaller wild fish'"). According to John Volkman, Senior Policy Advisor at
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Improvements in hatchery programs may reduce some of these
harms. For example, in 1995, four Columbia Basin treaty tribes
with fishing rights-the tribes of the Umatilla, Yakama, and Warm
Springs reservations and the Nez Perce tribe-released The Spirit of
the Salmon, a comprehensive salmon plan that advocated
supplementation of natural salmon stocks with hatchery fish.51
Unlike earlier hatchery management, the tribes' plan stated that
their hatcheries would simulate natural conditions to ensure that
hatchery fish are managed as one gene pool. 52 However, although
improving hatchery programs may increase salmon survival, clearly
more is required to bring some salmon species back from the
brink of extinction.
B. ListingSalmon Under the EndangeredSpecies Act

In 1980, Congress responded to the decline in wild salmon
runs by including a major salmon restoration project in the
Northwest Power Act.58 In that statute, Congress went so far as to
elevate salmon to "coequal partner" status with hydropower in the
operation of dams in the Columbia River Basin.54 However, despite
this attempt at system-wide protection, salmon runs continued
NOAA, the massive hatchery release in the Columbia River is a consequence of
"misconceptions about salmon life histories, and ambitious expectations about human
ability to improve on what was viewed as a wasteful natural world." See Volkman, supra note
41, at 725. For analysis of biological assessments of the effects of hatchery fish on wild
salmon, see Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 119-26.
51. Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n, Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi Wa-Kish-Wit (The Spirit
of the Salmon), 5B-24 (1995), discussed in Melissa Powers, Comment, The Spirit of the Salmon:
Hoo the TribalRestoration Plan Could Restore ColumbiaBasin Salmon, 30 ENvTL. L. 867 (2000).

52. Id. at v-vi.
53. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h) (2012). However, "Congress first expressed concern about
the potential effects of Columbia River hydropower operations on salmon as long ago as
1937, when it enacted the Bonneville Power Act." PracticingDeception, supra note 12, at 715;
see also 16 U.S.C. § 832a.
54. H.R. REP. No. 96-976, at 56-57 (1980), rprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5989, 6015.
The Northwest Power Act requires federal water managers to "exercise [their]
responsibilities consistent with the purposes of [the Act] and other applicable laws, to
adequately protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife, including related spawning
grounds and habitat, affected by [the Columbia River Basin hydropower system] in a
manner that provides equitable treatment for such fish." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11) (A) (i).
According to the Ninth Circuit, the obligation to provide equitable treatment is
substantive, requiring results, rather than procedural. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville
Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520, 1532 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Nw. Res. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Nw.
Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding review of Pacific
Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Council's amendments to Columbia River
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program to ensure that the plan was based on recommendations of
federal and state fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes).
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their precipitous decline.55 Because the Northwest Power Act failed
to accomplish its objective of putting salmon protection on par
with hydropower interests,56 in 1990, citizens began petitioning to
list species of salmon under the ESA. 57 By 2005, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 5 8 had listed
55. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 4 (observing that the restoration
program provided under the Northwest Power Act was not sufficient to keep salmon from
being listed under the ESA in the early 1990s); see also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra
note 24, at 45-52 (discussing the status of declining salmon populations); id. at 173 ("[I]n
1991, the American Fisheries Society's Endangered Species Committee reported a Pacific
Coast-wide salmon crisis: 101 naturally spawning salmon species faced 'a high risk of
extinction;' another 58 had a 'moderate risk of extinction;' and 54 more were judged to be
of 'special concern.' About one-third of those fish runs were in the Columbia Basin.").
56. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the Parity Promise:
Hydropower, Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENvTL. L. 657, 660-61
(1991) [hereinafter The Unraveling of the Parity Promise] ("The Northwest Power Act
promised that fish and wildlife would be treated 'on a par' with other river uses, as a 'coequal partner' with hydropower. Consequently, the two federal fishery agencies suspended
their status review in 1981 to allow the Act's protective measures to take effect.... Ten
years later, the fruits of the Northwest Power Act failed to prevent a number of ESA listing
petitions, and NMFS reinstated ESA status reviews of five Columbia Basin stocks in 1990.").
57. In 1990, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe petitioned NOAA to list Snake River
sockeye under the ESA. Endangered and Threatened Species: Petition to List Sockeye
Salmon in the Snake River, ID, 55 Fed. Reg. 22942-02 (June 5, 1990). NOAA agreed to list
Snake River sockeye as an endangered species in November 1991. See SACRIFICING THE
SALMON, supra note 24, at 174-75 (discussing the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe's petition and
the subsequent ESA listing). For a detailed review of salmon listings, see Columbia River
Basin, supra note 22, at 71-77. Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 "virtually without
opposition." Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 57
(2001). The Senate announced unanimous support for the ESA, and only four members
of the House of Representatives voted against the law. STANFORD ENVTL. L. Soc'Y, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES Act 14 (2001). Signing the ESA into law, President Richard Nixon
declared that wildlife conservation was needed, and that wildlife was "an irreplaceable part
of our national heritage." Id. Affirming alarm about disappearing species, a congressional
finding in the ESA states that "various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development
untempered by adequate concern and conservation." 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a) (1).
Nevertheless, application of this statute to issues of salmon conservation created a level of
controversy rivaling that caused by efforts to preserve northern spotted owls. See Daniel J.
Rohlf, There's Something Fishy Going on Here: A Critiqueof the National MarineFisheries Service's
Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENvTL. L. 617, 620 (1994) (observing

that petitions to list salmon created controversy similar to that caused by listing of the
northern spotted owl "almost overnight"); Salmon and the Endangered Species Act, supra note
21, at 589 ("The listings induced a more comprehensive approach to salmon restoration
than merely changing hydroelectric operations, expanding the focus of inquiry to
hatchery, harvest, and habitat activities that were beyond the scope of the Northwest Power
Act. The ESA therefore offered the prospect of designing a restoration program that
would address all major sources of salmon mortality, including public land and water use
decision-making, notjust hydropower.").
58. NOAA Fisheries was formerly the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), a
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thirteen Columbia Basin salmon runs.59
Under the ESA," often referred to as the "law of last resort"
for severely compromised species,6 ' listing results if either NOAA
or the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 62 determines
that a species or subspecies is "threatened" or "endangered." 6
For vertebrate fish and wildlife, Congress defined "species" to
include "distinct population segment[s]"6 in order to protect
"significant" populations that are important to a species' overall
survival. 65 Although providing protections to groupings below the
species level had previously been relatively uncontroversial,
disagreement over providing ESA protections for Pacific salmon
runs prompted NOAA and FWS to reconsider listing salmon
populations as distinct population segments.66 After some
deliberation, NOAA developed a new concept of an
"evolutionarily significant unit" (ESU) to determine whether there
is a distinct population segment of Pacific salmonids eligible for
listing. 67 To be considered an ESU, a population must meet two
criteria: (1) it must be "substantially reproductively isolated from
other conspecific population units," and (2) it must "represent an
important component in the evolutionary legacy of the biological

subagency of NOAA. This article will refer to NOAA rather than NMFS for the sake of
I
consistency.
59. See PracticingDeception, supra note 12, at 717.

60. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
61. See Columbia River Basin, supranote 22, at 71.

62. NOAA oversees protection of Pacific salmon, due to its life cycle that includes the
marine environment, while FWS is responsible for protection of freshwater and terrestrial
species. See Rohlf, supra note 57, at 618.
63. A species is listed as "endangered" when it is "in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012). A
"threatened" species is one that is "likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future." Id. § 1532(20).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2012); Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct
Vertebrate Population Segments under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722-01
(Feb. 7, 1996).
65. See Salmon and the EndangeredSpecies Act, supra note 21, at 527.

66. See Rohlf, supra note 57, at 620.
67. Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act
to Pacific Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612, 58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991). The concept of an ESU has
significantly influenced NOAA's listing decisions by providing a reason to reject ESA
protection for certain salmon runs. For example, citing the possibility of significant gene
flow between two salmon runs, the agency has declined to list one run, or has lumped two
runs together. See Salmon and the Endangered Species Act, supra note 21, at 528 n.50

(providing examples of rejections of listing for salmon runs based on the ESU concept).
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species."68
Listing a species prohibits federal agencies from proceeding
with actions that are likely to jeopardize that species or adversely
modify its critical habitat.69 To ascertain whether an action
jeopardizes a listed species or adversely modifies critical habitat, an
agency must decide whether its proposed action has a possible
effect on that species or critical habitat.70 For Columbia Basin
hydroelectric operations, the action agencies are the Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA), the United States Army Corps of
Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation.7 ' If one of those action
agencies determines that there is a possible effect, it must prepare
a biological assessment to evaluate the effects.72
Where a biological assessment indicates that the proposed
action is not likely to adversely affect the listed species or its critical
habitat, the agency may proceed without formal consultation if
NOAA concurs in writing.73 However, even when NOAA makes a
"no-jeopardy" conclusion, the agency must provide a written
statement (known as an Incidental Take Statement (ITS)) if the

68. Endangered and Threatened Species; Endangered Status for Snake River
Sockeye Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619, 58,621 (Nov. 20, 1991).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012)(describing an "agency action" as an action
carried out by a federal agency). The ESA does not define "jeopardy," but an ESA
regulation defines "jeopardize the continued existence of" as "engag[ing] in an action
that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the
likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1) (2012).
71. See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117,
1123 (D. Or. 2011).
72. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1) (2012).
73. 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a). In theory, the action agency has an independent duty to
comply with the congressional directive of avoiding jeopardy, regardless of whether NOAA
has done a BiOp. That is, section 7 of the ESA applies to (1) any "agency action," that (2)
"may affect" listed salmon. See, e.g., Peter M. Lacy, The Irrigated Desert and Imperiled Salmon:

"Reclaiming" llegally Spread Water via the EndangeredSpecies Act, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
351, 369 (2001) ("[Tlhe action agency has an independent duty to comply with the no
jeopardy requirement. Unless the action agency is granted an incidental 'take' exemption,
section 7(a) (2) requires assurance that a proposed action 'is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat.' The test for a finding ofjeopardy
,asks whether the action 'reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species.' Therefore,
for the [Bureau of Reclamation's] failure to control water spreading to fall within the
purview of section 7, a plaintiff must establish that water spreading amounts to (1) an
'agency action,' that (2) 'may affect' listed salmon." (internal footnotes omitted)).
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action would result in any "take" of the species.74 The ITS must:
(1) identify the impact of the incidental take on the species; (2)
specify the "reasonable and prudent measures" to minimize such
impact; (3) set forth terms and conditions governing
implementation of the reasonable and prudent measures; and (4)
establish the procedures that the agency will use to handle or
dispose of any animals that are taken.75 Action agencies that
comply with the terms and conditions of an ITS are exempt from
penalties for takings of listed species or harm to their habitat. MI
If a biological assessment of a proposed action suggests that the
action is likely to result in an adverse effect, the agency must
initiate a formal consultation on the effects, resulting in a BiOp
made available to the public."7 In this BiOp, NOAA or FWS must
explain how it arrived at its determination and may suggest
reasonable and prudent alternatives as mitigation measures to
keep the action from resulting in jeopardy or adverse modification
to critical habitat.78 Thus, the ESA mandates ostensibly significant
protections for listed species like Columbia Basin salmon.
III. JUDGE REDDEN'S ROLE IN ESA IMPLEMENTATION
Judges' role in fashioning remedies in ESA cases is unique, and
Judge Redden's oversight of the last decade of Columbia Basin
hydropower BiOps exemplified judicial involvement in public law
litigation. By ordering and participating in status conferences,
retaining experts, and otherwise pursuing detailed factual
information about the case, Judge Redden became the most
influential participant in the saga of salmon protection efforts
during the first years of the 21st century. Federal judges who
assume such a role in natural resources law litigation are rare.79
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (4), (c), (o) (2012); see alsoAriz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that ITSs were arbitrary
and capricious because they "fail[ed] to properly specify the amount of anticipated take
and to provide a clear standard for determining when the authorized level of take has
been exceeded"). Under the ESA, the term "take" means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (4) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o) (2) (2012).
77. 50.C.F.R. § 402.14 (regulations governing formal consultation).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2), (b) (3) (A) (2012). A BiOp may include an ITS. 50 C.F.R
§ 402.14(i).
79. Nevertheless, there have been a few federal judges willing to oversee complex
remedies, includingJudge George H. Boldt, former Senior United States DistrictJudge for
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A. TheJudicialRole in Implementing the ESA

Judges play an important role in ensuring compliance with the
ESA. When a BiOp is unlawful, the ordinary remedy is to vacate
and remand the BiOp to the agency so it can reinitiate
consultation.80 Such a remedy is consistent with the mandate of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which states that "the
reviewing court shall. . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action,

findings, and conclusions" found to be unlawful.8 ' Generally, the
result of invalidating an agency action is a reinstatement of the
prior action or rule.82 However, in some cases, and in the
the Western District of Washington. In the famous "Boldt decision," Judge Boldt ruled
that the state of Washington violated the treaty rights of several Western Washington
Indian tribes by denying them a sufficient portion of their off-reservation fishery. United
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 405-08 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1975), cerL. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). According to the judge, the treaties entitled
Indians to a "fair share" of the fish resources at "all usual and accustomed places." Id. at
331. He held that "fair share" meant an "equal share" of fifty percent of the offreservation fishery at usual and accustomed fishing grounds. See id. at 343. Judge Boldt
rejected the idea that Indian treaty rights changed upon the granting of statehood to
Washington, or by subsequent federal legislation, id. at 354, instead finding that treaty
rights were binding on the states, id. at 337. The judge proceeded to reserve jurisdiction
over remedies to ensure state compliance with his decision. Id at 347. Judge Boldt
explained that
[s]ubject to suggested limitations by some of the parties, all parties have urged
that the court reserve continuing jurisdiction of this case and have suggested
various ways in which such jurisdiction might be exercised. . . . From the
beginning most, if not all, counsel in this case and the court have anticipated
that continuing jurisdiction would be of great value to all parties in promptly
putting the court's rulings into effect and in providing readily available early
hearing and determination of factual and legal questions that may arise in
interpreting and applying such rulings.
Id He thus provided an elaborate declaration of judgment and decree, as well as an
injunction. Id. at 405-20. In ensuing years, Judge Boldt was forced to literally run the
Western Washington fishery when the state claimed that it lacked the authority under state
law to implement his decree. See 520 F.2d at 693 (BurnsJ., concurring) ("As was suggested
at oral argument, any decision by us to affirm also involves ratification of the role of the
district judge as a 'perpetual fishmaster.' Although I recognize that district judges cannot
escape their constitutional responsibilities, however unusual and continuing duties
imposed upon them, I deplore situations that make it necessary for us to become enduring
managers of the fisheries, forests, and highways, to say nothing of school districts, police
departments, and so on.").
80. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117,
1128 (D. Or. 2011) (citing Fla. Power & Light v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2012) (emphases added).
82. Nat'1 Wildihfe Fed'n, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (citing Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d
999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005)).
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environmental .context in particular, federal district courts have
declined vacatur and instead allowed an agency action to remain
in place while the agency reconsiders it.83 Indeed, Judge Redden
declined to vacate any of the three hydropower BiOps he
remanded,8 4 explaining in 2011 that
[d]espite the APA's requirement that an invalid agency action be
"set aside," equity can authorize the district court to keep an
invalid [BiOp] in place during any remand if it provides
protection for listed species.85
The question of whether to set aside an agency action is
particularly important in the ESA context. First, BiOps may
include measures beneficial to listed species, such as habitat
restoration, so vacating a BiOp may actually remove some of an
imperiled species' protections. 86 Second, vacatur could compel an
agency to halt ongoing operations (e.g., of the hydropower system)
to avoid incurring liability for unlawful takes of listed species.8 7
Thus, absent a BiOp and the accompanying ITS, NOAA would be
liable for the substantial take of salmon caused by the Columbia
River hydropower system.88 Consequently, in ESA suits a court may
be unwilling to vacate a BiOp, but instead may fashion other ways
of addressing the statutory violation in the interim while the
agency attempts to correct the deficiencies.
Judge Redden demonstrated this caution in remanding the
Columbia River Basin hydropower BiOps without vacatur. To limit
the effects of permitting an unlawful BiOp to continue to govern
hydropower operations and grant permission for take, the judge
retained jurisdiction on remand and ordered detailed remedies.8 9
Given the unusual considerations in remanding ongoing agency
83. Id (citing Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbit, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995)
(case under the ESA)); Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir.
1994) (case under the APA); W. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 633 F.2d 803, 813
(9th Cir. 1980) (case under the Clean Air Act).
84. Nat'l WildhfeFed'n, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23, 1129-30.
85. Id. at 1129.
86. Id. (opining that "such consequences would be disastrous for the listed species").
87. Id.

88. See id. at 1122 (stating that he had allowed an "ITS to remain to avoid a serious
disruption of hydroelectric power and an unmanageable flood of litigation arising from
the otherwise unlawful taking of the endangered species").
89. See generally infra Parts V.B, VI.C for a discussion ofJudge Redden's management
of the BiOps on remand.
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actions under the ESA, a judge's traditional reactive role is less
consistent with the remedial purpose of the statute than a more
active approach to remedies, such as that adopted by Judge
Redden in the hydropower BiOp litigation.
B. The "Managerialjudge"

The traditional model of the American judiciary is one in
which the judge remains in the background, a passive and
impartial umpire.90 However, the perception of the judge as
passive has evolved considerably in recent years,9 ' because many
judges have been thrust into a more active role. 92 Thus, Judge
Richard Posner once commented that "U udges, by the way, are
not wallflowers or potted plants."93 To describe this more active
judicial role, Professor Judith Resnik coined the phrase
"managerial judge" in 1982,91 and her terminology has since
become commonplace.95

90. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Reining in the American Litigator: The New Role of
American judges, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 3, 4 (2003). The New Yorker reported
in 2009 that at his Senate confirmation hearings, now ChiefJustice John Roberts discussed
the judiciary's role in terms of passivity and impartiality: "'Judges are like umpires,' [Chief
Justice] Roberts said at the time. 'Umpires don't make the rules. They apply them. The
role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But
it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ballgame to see the umpire.'"Jeffrey Toobin, No
More Mr. Nice Guy, THE NEW YORKER, May 25, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/

reporting/2009/05/25/090525fajfact_toobin. However, serving as an umpire is not always
consistent with the quest for justice. As Judge Marvin Frankel, district judge for the
Southern District of New York, stated: "Many judges, withdrawn from the fray, watch it
with benign and detached affection, chuckling nostalgically now and then as the truth
suffers injury or death in the process." Marvin E. Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal
Vier, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (1975). According to Judge Frankel, "[tihe judge views
the case from a peak of Olympian ignorance." Id. at 1042.
91. See, e.g., Marjorie 0. Rendell, What Is the Role of theJudge in Our Litigious Society?, 40
VILL. L. REv. 1115, 1118 (1995) ("To say that the discrete role of'judges in 1995 is to
preside over trials is like saying that the role of women in the 1990s is to care for the home.
Surely, we do that, but we do so much more."); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial
Judge Goes to Tiial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261, 1265 (2010) (referring to the concept of a
passive judge as "nostalgic").
92. SeeJudith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982) ("Many
federal judges have departed from their earlier attitudes; they have dropped the relatively
disinterested pose to adopt a more active, 'managerial' stance.").
93. Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 1988).
94. See William B. Rubenstein, A TransactionalModel of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,

371-72 n.4 (2001) (observing that Judith Resnik coined the phrase "managerial judges"
and described that paradigm). See generally Resnik, supra note 92.
95. See Thornburg, supra note 91, at 1267 (stating that Professor Resnik's phrase
"managerial judge" "has become a standard part of civil procedure vocabulary).
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"Managerial judging" evolved to address an increase in the
volume of judges' work96 and greater complexity in cases" by
expediting dispute resolution and encouraging settlement.98
Prototypical managerial decisions are essentially methods of
allocating limited resources99-often by disposing of cases through
settlement rather than trial. 00 The objective of quick dispositions
is often scorned, and from inception, managerial judging has been
linked to judicial activism, a longstanding object of criticism from
some quarters.' 0 ' However, criticisms of pretrial judicial
management should not extend to judges' involvement in
complex, posttrial remediation.
In her seminal article on managerial judging, Professor Resnik
distinguished between pretrial judicial management and posttrial
assignment of remedies,10 2 describing the latter as a necessary
response to the assertion of novel legal rights and proliferation of
public law cases. 0 Compared to pretrial managerial judging,
96. See Resnik, supra note 92, at 379 ("Partly because of their new oversight role and
partly because of increasing case loads, many judges have become concerned with the
volume of their work.").
97. See Chayes, supra note 19, at 1298 ("The litigation is often extraordinarily
complex and extended in time.").
98. See Thornburg, supra note 91, at 1267 (discussing the process of judicial case
management as "using various procedural tools to speed the process of dispute resolution
and encourage settlement").
99. See E. Donald Elliot, ManagerialJudgingand the Evolution of Procedure,53 U. CHI. L.

REV. 306, 311 (1986) ("The prototypical 'managerial' decision is one that allocates limited
resources. The notion that judges are to decide certain issues as 'managers' implies that
they must take into account the hard economic reality that procedural resources are
limited....").
100. See Resnik, supra note 92, at 379 ("J]udges have begun to experiment with
schemes for speeding the resolution of cases and for persuading litigants to settle rather
than try cases whenever possible.").
101. SeeRubenstein, supra note 94, at 417 ("Resnik was quite critical of the judiciary's
attempts to deal with these changes through this new form of what she labeled 'judicial
activism.'"); see also, e.g., William Wayne, The Two Faces ofiudicialActivism, 61 GEo. WASH. L.

REv. 1, 1 ("'Judicial activism' is, more often than not, a code word used to induce public
disapproval of a court action that a politician opposes, but is powerless to overturn.").
Some academic commentators have argued that managerial judging occurs without
guidance from rules or standards, is highly variable, threatens judicial impartiality, and is
effectively unreviewable. See Thornburg, supra note 91, at 1269-70; see aho, e.g., Jonathan T.
Molot, An Old judicialRole for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 41 (2003) ("This new
managerial role for judges has generated intense controversy.").
102. See Resnik, supra note 92, at 393-94, 409-15 (discussing posttrial judicial case
management).
103. See id. at 393-94 ("Posttrial judicial management is also a creature, in part, of a
shift-this time not in procedure, but in the use of lawsuits by diverse groups to assert
novel legal rights. The subject matter of such litigation does not fit easily within our
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Professor Resnik asserted, posttrial supervision is more visible to
the public, and therefore more legitimate. 04 In other words, she
saw managerial judging as more appropriate in the remedies phase
than before or during a trial. In addition, Professor Resnik claimed
that the bulk of detailed posttrial remediation occurs in public law
cases, in which the defendants are federal or state agencies, and
thus judges are constrained by their obligation to respect the
agencies' autonomy in decision making.105 That constraint
provides guidance for managerial courts.
C. Public Law Litigation
Litigation on behalf of the public began in earnest in the 1960s
and 1970s, when Congress enacted numerous statutes authorizing
administrative oversight of important public interests, including
environmental preservation,1 06 and public interest groups acquired
the resources to pursue social objectives through use of the legal
system. 0 7 In addition, several environmental protection statutes
encouraged public law litigation by authorizing "citizen suits" 10
and providing for awards of attorneys' fees." 9 Suits based on
environmental statutes that provide attorneys' fees have been
traditional conception of adjudication. The purpose of many public law cases is to reorient
the future dealings of the parties: to make wardens alter their treatment of inmates, to
reorganize school districts, to reform mental hospitals. Such changes are not
accomplished with a simple court order.").
104. See id, at 409-10 (asserting that "[p] retrial supervision affects fewer people than
does posttrial management, and, as a result, tends to be less visible," raising important
political issues).
105. See idL at 412. According to Professor Resnik, "a large percentage of posttrial
management occurs in public law cases, in which defendants are either federal or state
officials. In these cases, federal judges are constrained by the obligation to respect the
autonomy of coordinate branches of government and state executives." ML
106. See, eg., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1977); ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(1973); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1970); National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4334 (1969).
107. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 270, 278-79 (1989) ("The antecedents of many of today's public interest
litigants gradually grew from the time the Rules became effective. Only in the 1960s,
however, did these entities begin to secure the requisite resources to support substantial
expansion of their operations and to plan extensively for the type of suits now considered
public law litigation."); see also Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of ScarceJudicial
Resources: The Efficiency of FederalIntervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701 (1978) (suggesting
that public interest groups may best influence judicial decisions through intervention).
108. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1977); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7604 (1970).
109. See Tobias, supra note 107, at 285.
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termed "private attorney general actions,""10 in which public
interest groups step into the role of a public enforcer. As a result
of a proliferation of those cases, Professor Carl Tobias has
maintained that "public interest litigants have become
institutionalized participants in administrative proceedings and in
courtroom litigation challenging agency activity." "
In 1976, analyzing changing aspects of litigation and law," 2
Professor Chayes introduced the concept of "public law litigation."
Under the model he sketched, public law litigation differed from
traditional adjudication in several essential ways, including its
broad scope, party structure, concentration on future conditions,
concern over public consequences, negotiated remedy, and the
fact that the judge is responsible for "credible fact evaluation" and
3
for "shaping the litigation to ensure ajust and viable outcome." 11
110. See, e.g., Jan Chatten-Brown & Douglas Carstens, Practicing Public Interest
Environmental Law in the Private Sector, 38 No..5 ABA TRENDS 8 (2007) ("In many

environmental legal challenges, irreplaceable resources are protected, but no damages are
sought or awarded. Therefore, it is a challenge for nonprofits and community groups to
fund public interest litigation to protect the environment. Private attorney general actions,
or reliance on statutes that provide for attorneys' fees, is possible. At the federal level,
statutes such as the [Clean Water Act] and the ESA provide for such private enforcement
with statutory fee provisions. Moreover, where the statute underlying the litigation does
not provide such fees (e.g., [the National Environmental Policy Act]), fees are awardable
pursuant to statutes such as the Equal Access to Justice Act."); see also Edward J. Brunet,
The Primacy of Private Attorney General Enforcement in the United States, IND.J. OF ALTERNATIVE

DISPUTE RESOLUTION (forthcoming 2012); Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert
M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement of Statutoiy and Administrative Law in the United States (and

Other Common Law Countries), Univ. Penn. Law Sch., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-08 (2011).
111. See Tobias, supra note 107, at 293. According to Professor Tobias, the rise in
public interest litigation "has generated new forms, understandings, relationships, and
difficulties. Indeed, public law litigation may have transformed conventional
understandings of adjudication, of the judicial function, and of the components of a
lawsuit." Id. at 296.
112. Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell have argued that it is the rights public interest
litigants are vindicating that are new, not the remedies. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen
C. Yeazell, The Ordinaryand the Extraordinary in InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465,
516 (1980). Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell explained that they "do not deny that courts
have been up to new things, but we conclude that the novelty flows from the new rights
created rather than from the remedies employed. Twenty-five years ago few thought the
Constitution guaranteed mental patients clean sheets or prisoners hearings before parole
revocation. Having found such rights implied by the Constitution, courts have reached for
a remedial arsenal fitted out centuries ago for service in other wars." Id.
113. Chayes, supra note 19, at 1302. Professor Chayes specifically identified eight
characteristics of public law litigation as differing from traditional litigation: (1) the scope
of the lawsuit is not uniform but rather shaped primarily by the court and parties; (2) the
party structure is "sprawling and amorphous," involving more than just two parties; (3)
the fact inquiry looks not to past occurrences, but to future effects of the litigation; (4)
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Professor Tobias subsequently identified two types of public law
litigation: (1) institutional reform litigation, which seeks to
restructure aspects of institutional performance, and (2) public
interest litigation, which challenges the decision making of federal
administrative agencies. In the latter, judges assume the role of
ensuring that government actions are consistent with public
values;114 plaintiffs typically pursue relief affecting numerous
people, including -many nonparties and even institutional
structures; and defendants are usually large bureaucratic
institutions.115 Public interest remedies are often quite complex,
requiring ongoing judicial participation and novel mechanisms for
resolution.H6 For example, the Ninth Circuit explained in 2007
that
[w]here the public interest is involved, 'equitable powers assume
an even broader and more flexible character than when only a
private controversy is at stake.' Unless Congress provides
otherwise, '[c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go much
farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the
public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved.' 7
relief is forward looking and fashioned on flexible and broadly remedial lines, "often
having important consequences for many persons including absentees"; (5) the "remedy
is not imposed but negotiated"; (6) administration of a decree requires the judge's
continuing participation; (7) the judge is not passive but active, "with responsibility not
only for credible fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping the litigation to ensure a
just and viable outcome"; and (8) the suit is not about private rights, but about public
policy. Id
114. See Tobias, supra note 107, at 279-83 (providing an overview of institutional
reform litigation and distinguishing between the two types of public law litigation).
Professor Tobias asserts that "the judge purportedly is a public officer 'empowered by the
political agencies to enforce and create society-wide norms, and perhaps even restructure
institutions, as a way ... of giving meaning to our public values.'" See id at 282 (quoting 0.
Fiss, The Supreme Court4 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31
(1979)).
115. See Tobias, supra note 107, at 280 (observing that public interest plaintiffs
"typically pursue relief that could affect numerous people not before the court as well as
institutional, political, and economic structures," and "[d]efendants generally are large
bureaucratic institutions or agencies of the federal, state, or local government, such as
prisons or schools. The subject matter of these lawsuits usually is the policy, practice,
operation, or decisionmaking of those entities-in essence, a dispute over the conduct or
content of public policy.").
116. See id at 281 (asserting that public interest litigation often requires significant
and ongoing judicial involvement).
117. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 680 (9th Cir.
2007) (quoting United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 431 F.3d 643, 654 (9th Cir. 2005) and
United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 575 F.2d 222, 228 (9th Cir. 1978)).
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Thus, the nature of public interest litigation has not escaped
federal judges, includingJudge Redden.
D. JudgeRedden's Management on Remand

Litigation over the Columbia Basin hydroelectric BiOps is an
archetypal example of Professor Chayes' "public law litigation."" 8
Disputes over hydropower management have been extremely
broad in scope, spanning more than two decades,"19 involving
numerous interested parties representing government agencies,
states, industries, environmental protection, and conservation for
public use, among others, and affecting several million people as
well as more than a dozen species of listed salmonids.o20 In
addition, the inquiry into the permissibility of hydropower BiOps is
primarily forward-looking-in other words, the case revolves
around the future of listed salmonids, not the past acts of
government agencies.121 Further, review of overlapping BiOps
required continuing supervision from both Judge Redden and his
predecessor, Judge Marsh, and Judge Redden extended his
influence over the remand process as well as review of the
completed BiOps.122 Finally, litigation over dam operations and
salmon protection is fundamentally about public policy, not
private rights. It therefore is quite appropriate to consider Judge
Redden's role in the salmon saga in light of the unique qualities of
public law disputes.
Another important aspect of the judge's management of BiOp
review is that his in-depth involvement took place after litigation
had reached some point of termination-here the repeated
disposition was remand of an unlawful BiOp.123 Thus, Judge
118. See generaly Chayes, supra note 19.

119. Judge Marsh first reviewed a Columbia Basin hydropower BiOp in 1993. See
Idaho Dep't Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 899 (D. Or.
1994); NOAA's next draft BiOp is due in 2014. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1130 (D. Or. 2011).
120. See supra note 20 for a list of defendants and defendant-intervenors, infra note
172 for a list of plaintiffs, and supra note 12 for a source discussing the fact that NOAA has
listed thirteen species of Columbia Basin salmonids under the ESA.
121. See, e.g., infra note 346 for Judge Redden's statement that his objective was to
"help endangered salmon and steelhead."
122. For a review of Judge Redden's remands of the hydropower BiOps, see infra
Parts V.B, VI.C, and VII.
123. See supra note 122.
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Redden's oversight should be considered in light of scholarship
analyzing posttrial remediation. Indeed, as Professor Resnik
predicted, 24 Judge Redden's supervision of remedies in the
hydropower BiOp litigation has been characterized by visibility in
the form of publicly available transcripts of meetings, as well as
accountability and deference to government agencies. By involving
the plaintiffs in discussions of developing and improving the
BiOps, the judge made NOAA more accountable for consideration
of salmon survival and also fostered a more transparent process of
25
analysis.1
Despite rejecting three consecutive BiOps as unlawful,126 Judge
Redden remained deferential to the government agencies
throughout his decade of involvement with the case. For example,
he deferred to NOAA's expertise on matters of interpreting
scientific results 27 and granted the agency's request to leave the
BiOps in place on remand.'28 Additionally, he limited his
directives, reaching only the questions necessary for him to
determine an outcome.'" In sum, the judge appropriately
permitted public review of policy questions concerning the
balance between economic interests and preservation and
restoration of listed species, and he did so while exercising
considerable judicial restraint and demonstrating respect for
agency expertise.
IV. PRE-REDDEN REVIEW OF HYDROPOWER BIOPS
The numerous BiOps on hydropower operations in the
Columbia River Basin have been the subject of contention for two
decades. In 1992, shortly after listing Snake River sockeye and
chinook, NOAA issued its first BiOp on hydroelectric operations in
124. See supra notes 95-105 for a discussion of Professor Resnik's distinction between
pretrial "managerial judging" and posttrial supervision of remediation.
125. See infra Parts V.B, VI.C, and VII for a review ofJudge Redden's management of
the BiOps on remand, including discussion of meetings that involved both plaintiffs and
defendants.
126. For a review of Judge Redden's remands of the hydropower BiOps, see infra
Parts V.B, VLC, and VII.
127. See, e.g., infra note 285 and accompanying text (granting deference to the
agency's scientific judgment and thus approving its proposals for early spring spill, and
also summer spill).
128. See supra notes 80-89 for an overview ofJudge Redden's decision not to vacate
the 2000 BiOp.
129. See, e.g., infra note 238 (explaining that the four issues Judge Redden
considered were dispositive, so he would not reach the others raised by the plaintiffs).
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the Columbia Basin. 30 In this early BiOp, NOAA concluded not
only that 1992 operations would not jeopardize the continued
existence of listed salmon, but also that operations were actually
beneficial because operations under the BiOp would improve
survival over the plan adopted by the Northwest Power Planning
Council under the Northwest Power Act.' 3 ' Despite concern that
merely targeting improvements over the status quo, rather than
attempting to ensure viable populations, would not halt decline of
the species, 32 the 1992 BiOp was not questioned in court.133
However, NOAA's finding of no jeopardy did not remain
unchallenged for long.
A. The 1993 BiOp

In 1993, NOAA issued a second BiOp concerning Columbia
Basin hydroelectric operations, in which it refined its analysis of
jeopardy. 3 4 Under the new analysis, the agency decided that
hydropower operations must (1) improve salmon survival, as
measured against a 1986-1990 baseline, and (2) in combination
with other human activities on the Columbia River, be reasonably
likely to reduce salmon mortality. 35 Because it concluded that the
proposed 1993 hydroelectric operations met both criteria, NOAA
issued a no-jeopardy finding, announcing a very modest goal of
merely stopping the decline in salmon runs over the following

130. See Salmon and the Endangered Species Act, supra note 21, at 550.
131. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT SECTION 7
CONSULTATION/CONFERENCE BIOLOGICAL OPINION: 1992 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL
COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, at 35 (1992); see alo The Unraveling of the Parity Promise,
supra note 56, at 666-70 (discussing the Northwest Power Act).

132. See Practicing Deception, supra note 12, at 736 (asserting that NOAA's 1992 plan
for hydroelectric operations "made no attempt to restore salmon populations to healthy,
viable levels" and describing the agency's stance on balancing hydropower and salmon as
"hopefully the situation will get no worse"). For example, Jidge Marsh, Judge Redden's
predecessor, discussed what he deemed to be the "incongruous result" caused by focusing
on mortality decreases to determine "no jeopardy": "(If 100 listed species are expected to
survive downstream juvenile migration in 1993, and 99 survived in 1990," a "no jeopardy"
finding could result, "even though a 100 survival level may still be considered so low as to
constitute a continued threat to the species' existence." Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v.
Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 899 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d

1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
133.

See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 24, at 179.

134. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886,
890-91 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as mont, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
135. See id at 892-93.
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fifteen years. 136
The states of Idaho and Oregon responded by filing suit,
alleging that NOAA's choice of the baseline period and its lifecycle modeling of salmon mortality were arbitrary and
capricious. 3 7 In Idaho Department of Fish & Game v. NationalMarine

FisheriesService, United States District Court Judge Malcolm Marsh
concluded that NOAA's 1986-1990 baseline skewed salmon
counts, since salmon runs were at record lows during that
period.'38 As Judge Marsh recognized, a baseline that included
years of greater salmon counts would impose a more stringent
standard for improving salmon survival. 39 According to Judge
Marsh, NOAA impermissibly "focussed [sic] on the system
capabilities tending to the status quo rather than stabilization of
the species."1 40 In short, NOAA set the bar too low.
Turning his attention -to -NOAA's life-cycle modeling, Judge
Marsh again rejected an important aspect of the agency's jeopardy
analysis. He determined that NOAA had discounted low range
assumptions about survival and failed to consider the appropriate
range of risk assumptions.141 By disregarding low-end, worst-case
assumptions, NOAA had inflated its confidence in salmon survival
rates from fifty percent to between sixty and seventy percent.142
Moreover, the judge concluded that NOAA had inflated
confidence levels by failing to consider the effects of the
"extinction vortex"-the enhanced risk associated with small
populations. 4 3 Judge Marsh noted that considering the
"extinction vortex" was especially important because, for example,
despite obtaining ESA protection, NOAA expected that only five
Snake River sockeye and just 242 to 246 fall chinook would return
to their spawning grounds in 1993.'"
136. M at 897-98.
137. M at 891.
138. I at 893 ("I find that NMFS' selection of the '86-'90 baseline is arbitrary and
capricious because the agency failed to consider relevant facts such as the drought
condition and low run numbers of the species during the base period.").
139. Id ("It is clear that a longer base period which includes years of higher
abundance levels would have encompassed higher escapement levels and would have
resulted in a higher goal.").
140. Id.
141. Id at 898.
142. Id
143. Id. at 898-99.
144. Id. at 899. Stating the obvious, Judge Marsh referred to these numbers as
"perilously low." Id. Just three years later, in 1997, Snake River sockeye were "virtually
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Judge Marsh proceeded to observe that the process NOAA
pursued for salmon protection was "seriously, 'significantly,'
flawed because it is too heavily geared towards a status quo that has
allowed all forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit situationthat is, relatively small steps, minor improvements and
adjustments-when the situation literally cries out for a major
overhaul." 45 Therefore, the judge granted the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment, ordering NOAA to reinitiate consultation
consistent with his findings.146 However, no overhaul was
forthcoming. Instead of focusing energy on salmon recovery,
NOAA continued to prefer changing hydroelectric operations only
minimally-at the expense of salmon runs.147
B. The 1995 BiOp

NOAA expanded its next attempt to comply with the ESA by
issuing a hydropower BiOp to cover dam operations for five years,
from 1995 to 1999.48 Unlike the 1993 BiOp, the 1995 BiOp

concluded that hydropower operations would indeed jeopardize
listed salmon species. 49 Nevertheless, environmental groups and
the state of Oregon filed suit, claiming that the 1995 BiOp was
inadequate because it failed to (1) adequately lay out the ways in
which reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) would avoid
jeopardy; (2) consider state and tribal life-cycle modeling results,
extinct," because only one fish returned to Redfish Lake in 1994. Am. Rivers v. Nat'1
Marine Fisheries Serv., No. Civ. 96-384-MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 3,
1997).
145. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 900. According to Judge Marsh,
"[instead of looking for what can be done to protect the species from jeopardy, NMFS
and the action agencies have narrowly focused their attention on what the establishment is
capable of handling with minimal disruption." Id.
146. Id. at 900-01.
147. See PracticingDeception, supra note 12, at 738 ("The overhaul Judge Marsh called
for never occurred because NOAA persisted [to] disregard . . . precautionary salmon
management in favor of traditional hydrosystem operations.").
148. Am. Rivers, 1997 WL 33797790, at *1, *4. Just before Judge Marsh decided Idaho
Fish & Game, NOAA finished a BiOp intended to cover hydropower operations from 1994
to 1998 that was substantially similar to its 1993 BiOp. To comply with Judge Marsh's
order, the agency reinitiated consultation. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 90-91;
Salmon and the Endangered Species Act, supra note 21, at 553, 522-55 (alleging that the move

from one- to five-year BiOps was one of the salmon's several contributions to the ESA that
outweighed the ESA's contributions to listed salmon).
149. Am. Rivers, 1997 WL 33797790, at *6. The plaintiffs in this case were
environmental groups joined by the State of Oregon. Id. at *1. Additionally, the Yakama,
Umatailla, Nez Perce, and Warm Springs Tribes, as well as the State of Alaska, filed amicus
briefs in support of the plaintiffs and the State of Oregon. Id. at *2-3.
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relying instead on overly optimistic modeling; and (3) explain why
the agency dropped a twenty-four-year period from its analysis,
leading to more optimistic results in its review. "
In contrast to his decision about the 1993 BiOp and
encouragement to overhaul plans for salmon protection,15 in
American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Service,

Judge

Marsh

upheld NOAA's 1995 BiOp. 52 After deciding that the agency's
explanation of RPAs was sufficient, and that it had made a
reasoned evaluation when it chose to rely on certain life-cycle
modeling and to drop the twenty-four-year period from its analysis,
Judge Marsh deferred to NOAA's judgment.s53 Ultimately, he
concluded that deference was warranted because the ESA "says
nothing about risk tolerance, and the limits of judicial review
dictate that I not interfere with a federal agenc [y's] exercise of
professional judgment or their reasoned decisions."15 But Judge
Marsh explained that deference to NOAA did not amount to
judicial confidence with the agency's plans for salmon protection;
instead, he indicated unease with the agency's potential
recklessness in accepting high levels of risk when managing
salmon runs: "Given the dwindling numbers, time is clearly
running out. As a long-time observer and examiner of this process,
I cannot help but question the soundness of the selected level of
risk acceptance."155
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Marsh's approval of the 1995
BiOp in a brief opinion in 1999.156 However, when Judge Redden
150. 1I at *4-5, *8, *9. In an earlier draft of the 1995 BiOp, NOAA considered
recovery over both a twenty-four-year period and a forty-eight-year period, but the final
1995 BiOp included only an analysis of recovery over a forty-eight-year period, which
produced the most optimistic results. Id. at *9.
151. See Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. at
900.
152. Am. Rivers, 1997 WL 33797790, at *14.
153. For example, Judge Marsh stated that "[a]lithough NMFS' optimism may be
criticized, I cannot say that the proposed action within RPA fail to provide a sufficiently
reasoned justification for NMFS' no jeopardy conclusion." Id. at *9.
154. Id. at*10.
155. Id
156. Am. Rivers v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 97-36159, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
3860, at *4, *8 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 1999) (affirming Am. Rivers v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
1997 WL 33797790) ("NMFS reasonably explained the close relationship between
jeopardy and critical habitat and identified certain effects of the dam operations (e.g.,
reduction of water velocity and increase in water temperature) that both jeopardize the
species themselves and adversely modify the species' critical habitat.. .. Given NMFS's
expertise in this area, the nature of the proposed action (dam operations), and the
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assumed review of the case upon Judge Marsh's change to senior
judge status in 1998, NOAA's judgment in risking extinction of
listed salmon species would face a new round of legal challenges.
V. JUDGE REDDEN'S FIRST REMAND: THE 2000 BIOP
In 2000, NOAA issued a new BiOp on hydroelectric operations
from 2001 to 2005.157 Under the 2000 BiOp, NOAA retained the
dual standard approach it employed in its 1995 BiOp,'-8 seeking
both survival and recovery of salmon species.159 However, NOAA's
definition of "survival" became more favorable to hydropower
operations in the 2000 BiOp; that is, a salmon species would
achieve "survival" if only one adult salmon returned to spawn over
a salmon generation.iso Nevertheless, even using this weak
standard and a likelihood of recovery that was only "moderate to
high,"' 6 ' NOAA concluded that hydroelectric operations would
jeopardize the eight listed salmon species spawning above
Bonneville Dam.162
As a result of its jeopardy finding, NOAA analyzed RPAs that
included mitigation measures needed to meet the agency's
standards for survival and recovery.s63 NOAA's proposed
mitigation included studies on salmon survival, a continued
reliance on salmon transportation, and changes in spill. But these
measures alone did not avoid jeopardy.164 Consequently, although
species' habitat at issue here, we cannot say that NMFS's conclusion in the 1995 BiOp that
the jeopardy analysis 'encompasses' the critical habitat analysis was arbitrary and
capricious.").
157. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION, REINITIATION OF
CONSULTATION ON OPERATIONS OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM,
INCLUDING THE JUVENILE FISH TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM, AND 19 BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA BASIN (Dec. 21, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 BiOp].
For a detailed description of this BiOp, see PracticingDeception, supra note 12, at 749-60.
158. 2000 BiOp, supra note 157, at 1-13,1-14.
159. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 94.
160. 2000 BiOp, supra note 157, at 1-13.
161. Id. at 8-3, 8-5, 8-7, 8-13, 8-15, 8-17, 8-23, 8-25 (identifying a "moderate to
high likelihood" of recovery for all eight listed salmon species spawning above Bonneville
Dam, including all Snake River species, Upper Columbia spring/summer chinook and
steelhead, Middle Columbia steelhead, and Columbia River chum).
162. Id
163. Id.
164. See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 24, at 187 (stating that in its analysis of
operational mitigation, "[b]asically the BiOp's approach was to assume that the Lower
Snake Dams would not be breached, then attempt to craft an aggressive restoration
program around the continued existence of the dams").
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most RPAs attempt to mitigate the effects of the action itself,165 the
2000 BiOp focused on offsite mitigation, relying on proposed
changes related to harvest, habitat, and hatchery management
instead of major alterations to dam operations.16 6 Although
unstated, the clear goal of this reliance on offsite mitigation
seemed to be to avoid having to recommend breaching dams on
the Lower Snake River. 167
In relying on offsite mitigation, NOAA considered the
proposed actions in light of an area much larger than the "action
area" (the mainstem of the river, where the dams exist), placing
the burden of recovering salmon beyond the operation of the
dams. 68 Further, implementation of offsite mitigation measures in
the 2000 BiOp-including financing and initiating improvements
to habitat, funding hatchery program reform, and working with
federal, state, and tribal fishery agencies to set and limit harvest
rates-was largely left to agencies that had no role in operating
hydropower facilities.169 For example, the 2000 BiOp directed BPA
to "work with" other agencies like the Environmental Protection
Agency and the United States Geological Survey to develop habitat
improvement plans.o70 Based on an assumption that these sorts of
mitigation measures would actually occur, NOAA concluded that
federal hydropower operations in the Columbia River Basin
between 2001 and 2005 would not jeopardize listed salmon

165. See PracticingDeception, supra note 12, at 753 ("Although RPAs generally attempt
to mitigate the adverse effects an agency's action may have on listed species by altering the
proposed action itself, remarkably, the 2000 BiOp called for very few [Federal Columbia
River Power System] operational changes, and instead made only minor technical
changes.").
166. 2000 BiOp, supra note 157, at 9-1, 9-2; see also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra
note 24, at 187 ("This approach drew the BiOp's focus away from the hydroelectric system,
the cause of most man-induced salmon mortalities.").
167. See Michael C. Blumm & Melissa Powers, Avoiding Dam Breaching Through Offsite
Mitigation: NMP5's 2000 Biological Opinion on Columbia Basin Hydroelectric Operations, 32

ENvTL. L. 241, 261-64 (2002) [hereinafter Avoiding Dam Breaching] (describing the habitat,
hatchery, and harvest elements of the RPA). Even though NOAA determined that
breaching Lower Snake River dams provided the most certainty of long-term survival and
recovery of salmon species, it rejected this option because it was politically controversial.
See id, at 241 ("To avoid the politically controversial position of recommending dam
breaching, the 2000 biological opinion called for numerous 'offsite' mitigation measures
involving habitat restoration, hatchery operations, and harvest management.").
168. 2000 BiOp, supra note 157, at 1-9.
169. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 95.
170. 2000 BiOp, supra note 157, at 9-137; see also Avoiding Dam Breaching,supra note

167, at 261-67 (discussing offsite mitigation measures in the 2000 BiOp).
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species.171
A. Rejecting the 2000 BiOp

In response to NOAA's issuance of the proposed 2000 BiOp,
numerous environmental and conservation groups filed suit,
claiming that the BiOp's finding of no jeopardy was arbitrary and
capricious.1 72 This time, the environmentalists alleged that the
agency had arrived at a no-jeopardy conclusion by relying on
proposed federal mitigation measures that had not undergone
section 7 consultations, as well as state and -private mitigation
measures that were not "reasonably certain" to occur, as required
by the ESA.' 73 The State of Oregon and the tribes of the Nez Perce,
Yakama, Umatilla, and Warm Springs Reservations supported the
plaintiffs, submitting amicus curiae briefs.174 In 2003, in National
Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries I (NWF v. NMFS I),

Judge Redden agreed with the environmentalists, forcing NOAA to
reconsider its 2000 BiOp. 75
Judge Redden first concluded that NOAA's defined "action
area" was arbitrary and capricious because it excluded the rangewide area subject to the indirect effects of hydropower
operations. 7 6 He observed that NOAA's definition of the action
area was limited to the area immediately around the dam
operations-that is, the Columbia and Snake Rivers.'" In support
of his conclusion that NOAA's narrow definition of the action area
171. Nat'I Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp..2d 1196, 121314 (D. Or. 2003).
172. Id at 1199-1200. The sixteen environmental and conservation groups that were
plaintiffs in this case included National Wildlife Federation, Idaho Wildlife Federation,
Washington Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, Trout Unlimited, Pacific Coast Federation of
Fishermen's Associations, Institute for Fisheries Resources, Idaho Rivers United, Idaho
Steelhead and Salmon United, Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association, Friends of the
Earth, Salmon for All, and Columbia Riverkeeper. Id.
173. Id. at 1205 ("Plaintiffs, the Treaty Tribes, and the State of Oregon contend that
the no-jeopardy conclusion in the 2000BiOp is arbitrary and capricious, and therefore
invalid, because it relies on future federal mitigation actions that have not undergone
section 7 consultation. Moreover, plaintiffs contend that the no-jeopardy conclusion also
relies on the implementation of non-federal off-site mitigation actions that are not
reasonably certain to occur.").
174. Id. at 1200.
175., Id. at 1215-16.
176. Id. at 1212. As the judge noted, "'[a] ction area' means all areas to be affected
directly or indirectly by the Federal action, and not merely the immediate area involved in the
action." Id. at 1205 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.02).

177. Id. at 1212.
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violated the ESA, the judge also noted that the 2000 BiOp relied
heavily on offsite mitigation occurring beyond that limited range,
with the result that much of the mitigation would actually occur
outside the action area. 78
Second, Judge Redden rejected NOAA's reliance on offsite
mitigation measures.179 NOAA premised offsite mitigation success
on actions that had a "reasonable chance of being
implemented." 80 However, this promise fell short of the ESA
requirement that such actions must be reasonably certain to
occur.' 8 ' Because there was no evidence demonstrating that any of
the states, tribes, or private entities responsible for overseeing
offsite mitigation had committed to funding or implementing any
of the mitigation measures the RPA assigned them, Judge Redden
decided that those measures were not in fact "reasonably certain"
to occur.'82 Moreover, he concluded that NOAA incorrectly relied
on federal mitigation measures, such as habitat and harvest
mitigation actions, that had not undergone section 7
consultations. 8 s Judge Redden therefore ruled that the 2000
BiOp's finding of no jeopardy was arbitrary and capricious. 8 4
Rejecting both NOAA's defined action area and the agency's
reliance on uncertain offsite mtitigation measures, Judge Redden
178. AL at 1213 ("If the proposed range-wide, off-site mitigation actions are not, in
reality, part of the action area, they should not have been included within the 'cumulative
effects' analysis of the 2000BiOp. However it is apparent that NOAA included them as part
of the RPA in the 2000BiOp tojustify its no-jeopardy conclusion.").
179. Id at 1215.
180. Id. at 1213 (quoting I FED. CAUCUS, CONSERVATION OF COLUMBIA BASIN FISH:
FINAL

BASINWIDE

SALMON

RECOVERY

STRATEGY

23

(2000),

available

at

http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/Files/BiologicalOpinions/2000/2000-FinalStrategyVol
I.pdf).
181. Id. at 1214; see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (enumerating ESA regulations defining
"indirect effects" as "those that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time,
but still are reasonably certain to occur").
182. Nat'1 Wildlfe Fed', 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1213-15. Judge Redden quoted Oregon's
assertion that the 2000 BiOp "relies on actions for which necessary funding is unavailable,
actions for which the agencies lack authority, and actions that are not reasonably certain to
occur because of the lack of binding agreements." Id. at 1213 (quoting Brief for State of
Oregon as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, Nat'I Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Or. 2002); see also Or. Natural Res. Council v.
Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152-56 (D. Or. 1998) (overturning
NMFS' decision not to list an ESU of coho salmon as threatened under the ESA, and
explaining that NMFS improperly relied on voluntary mitigation measures, rather than
regulatory mitigation measures).
183. Nat'1Wldfe RFedn, 254 F.Supp. 2d at 1210, 1215.
184. Id. at 1215.
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remanded the 2000 BiOp to NOAA. 185 He subsequently held a
conference with counsel of record at which all parties agreed that
the court should grant NOAA one year to cure the deficiency.18 6 At
the conference, NOAA requested that Judge7 Redden leave the
2000 BiOp in place pending issuance of a new BiOp, but the
environmental groups objected, instead asking the court to vacate
the 2000 BiOp.187 NOAA objected to this vacatur on three
grounds: (1) no additional harm would occur to salmon if the
2000 BiOp was left in place during the one-year remand period;
(2) takes of salmon would continue even if the judge vacated the
BiOp; and (3) curtailing Columbia Basin hydroelectric operations
could significantly damage the "economic and social fabric of the
region"188 by exposing action agencies to ESA liability for those

takes of salmon.
On July 1, 2003, Judge Redden 'denied the environmental
groups' motion to vacate the BiOp. 189 According to the judge, the
environmental groups had failed to show that vacating the 2000
BiOp during the remand period would limit jeopardy to salmon. 90
Judge Redden also decided that the environmental groups had not
effectively countered NOAA's concerns that vacatur would
substantially disrupt hydropower operations by exposing action
agencies to liability under the ESA for takes of salmon during the
remand period.191 Thus, he opted to permit the 2000 BiOp to
remain in place.192 However, Redden retained jurisdiction over the
case during the remand, setting a date for a conference to discuss

185. Id.
186. Order on Motions for SummaryJudgment at 2, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, No. 3:01cv-00640-SI, (D. Or.June 2, 2003), ECF No. 406.
187. Id.
188. Opinion & Order at 2, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI, (D. Or. July
1, 2003), ECF 439-2. In contrast, the State of Oregon encouraged Judge Redden to leave
the 2000 BiOp in place but retain jurisdiction during the period of remand and allow
motions to assert additional protective measures as necessary to avoid further jeopardy. Id.
at 3. Although the judge decided to leave the BiOp in place, he declined to entertain
motions to assert additional protective measures. Id. at 4.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 3.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 3-4. For discussions of remand without vacation, see Kristina Daugirdas,
Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New

Judicial

Remedy for Defective Agency

Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (2005); Benjamin W. Tettlebaum, Note, "Vacation"atthe
Farm: Why Courts Should Not Extend "Remand Without Vacation" to EnvironmentalDeregulation,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (2012).
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the parameters and timing of periodic reports.193 He also
appointed a technical advisor to help him understand the
intricacies of ESA requirements.194
B. Managingthe 2000 BiOp on Remand

On July 21, 2003, Judge Redden established an Attorneys'
Steering Committee to facilitate communication and cooperation
among the parties and the court. 95 The steering committee
meetings were open to the public, and the court ensured that
transcripts of the meetings were available to the public. 196 Judge
Redden made no rulings at the steering committee meetings, but
he participated in discussions and scheduled meetings with the
committee at intervals during the remand period. 97
In January 2004, after NOAA released its second quarterly
report, Judge Redden met with the steering committee again.' 98
After reviewing the report, the judge expressed concern about
steps not yet taken because the agency had not yet (1) compiled
data on 2001 salmon returns; (2) collaborated with federal
agencies, the states, or the tribes; or (3) developed monitoring
programs or performance standards necessary to implement
reasonable and prudent alternatives, offsite mitigation plans, or
habitat and hatchery measures.199
193. Opinion & Order at 4, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI, (D. Or. July
1, 2003), ECF No. 439-2.
194. Opinion & Order at 8, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI, (D. Or. Mar.
2, 2005), ECF No. 793. All parties agreed that Judge Redden should have access to a
technical advisor, and NOAA agreed to pay for that service. Id. Nevertheless, in March
2005, Senior District Court Judge Ancer Haggerty got involved because the intervening
irrigators moved to have Judge Redden disqualified from the case, arguing in part that the
judge's meetings with the technical advisor constituted ex parte contacts. Id. However,
observing that "[iut is well known that cases brought under the ESA can involve complex
technical and scientific matters," Judge Haggerty declined the irrigators' request for oral
argument and denied their motion. Id. at 2.
195. Id at 6 ("At an in-court status conference with the parties held July 21, 2003 ...
Judge Redden suggested that a steering committee might be created to monitor the
progress of the remand and facilitate the cooperation in consultation required to
complete the remand. The parties agreed a steering committee would be a good way to
monitor progress and cooperation."). See also Opinion & Order at 2, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1196,
No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI, (D. Or. May 13, 2004), ECF No. 496 (discussing the Attorneys'
Steering Committee).
196. Opinion & Order at 6, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI, (D. Or. Mar.
2, 2005), ECF No. 793.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 8.
199. Id.
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After an April 2004 meeting with the parties, the action
agencies, and interested members of the public, Judge Redden
agreed that some extension of time to complete a revised BiOp was
necessary.200 Consequently, in May 2004, he granted a motion for
extension, permitting NOAA to have until the end of November
2004 to complete its BiOp.20 In his order granting that motion,
Judge Redden set the next steering committee meeting for June 4,
2004 and directed the committee to consider hatchery policy and
annual spill plans, make progress on securing funding for
mitigation measures, and report on NOAA's interpretation of
jeopardy, among other things. 202 The May 2004 order also
indicated to the parties that the judge might want discussion of
spill at the next committee meeting. 203
C. The 2004 Summer Spill Decision

In July 2004, while NOAA was revising the 2000 BiOp rejected
by Judge Redden, BPA and the Army Corps of Engineers issued a
"statement of decision" in which the agencies decided to curtail
the summer spill at four Columbia River Dams. 204 Since spilling
water over the dams is the safest way for juvenile salmon to pass
hydroelectric dams, 205 the 2000 BiOp had assigned summer spill
the "highest priority."20 Nevertheless, in July of 2004, NOAA
approved the proposal put forth by BPA and the Corps, opting to
curtail summer spills at the Dalles and Bonneville dams during the
summer of 2004.207
In defense of its decision to approve curtailment of summer
spill, NOAA claimed that the measure would generate an
additional $18-28 million in revenue from increased hydropower
200. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640-RE, 2004 WL
1080168, at *1 (D. Or. May 13, 2004).
201. Id.
202. See id. at *1; Opinion & Order at 3-4, 2004 WL 1080168, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI,
(D. Or. May 13, 2004), ECF No. 496.
203. Opinion & Order at 4, 2004 WL 1080168, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI, (D. Or. May 13,
2004), ECF No. 496.
204. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV-01-6940-RE, 2004
WL 1698050, at *1-2 (D. Or. July 29, 2004).
205. See Columbia River Basin, supra note 22, at 97 ("Spill is the safest way for juvenile
salmon migrating in the river to pass hydroelectric dams, but water spilled over the dams
does not generate power.").
206. Nat'l Wiltdlfe Fed'n, 2004 WL 1698050 at *1; see also 2000 BiOp, supra note 157, at
9-82.
207. Nat'l Wildlife Fedn, 2004 WL 1698050 at *1.
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production, 208 and also that a series of offsets, including releasing
100,000 acre-feet of water from the Brownlee Reservoir in July
2004 to increase river flows to help juvenile salmon migrate down
the river, would mitigate the adverse effects of the lack of spill. 2so
However, in National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries
Service II (NWF v. NMIS II), environmental and conservation groups

challenged NOAA's decision to approve curtailed spill. 210
In July 2004, responding in part to technical advice from Dr.
Horton, Judge Redden agreed with the plaintiffs and rejected the
proposed curtailment of spill, concluding that there were
"fundamental defects in [the agency's] reasoning."211 First, the
judge observed that the 100,000 acre-feet of water from Brownlee
Reservoir was not "new" water because the 2000 BiOp assumed
that substantial water releases from Brownlee Reservoir would
continue.212 Second, he determined that NOAA's assumption that
the water from Brownlee Reservoir would be released at a uniform
rate over twenty-one days, keeping water temperatures within an
acceptable range, was "unsupportable." 213 Judge Redden
concluded that these "flawed assumptions,"2 14 as well as NOAA's
that projected survival
indicating
own documentation
improvements had not materialized, undermined confidence in
the agency's reasoning.215 He therefore enjoined the Corps from
implementing summer spill curtailments. 216

208. See PracticingDeception, supra note 12, at 764; see alsoBONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN.,
2004 FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM JUVENILE BYPASS OPERATIONS STATEMENT
OF DECISION (2004).
209. Nat'1 Wildlife Fed'n, 2004 WL 1698050 at *4.
210. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs in this suit were the National Wildlife Federation, Idaho
Wildlife Federation, Washington Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, Trout Unlimited, Pacific
Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations, Institute for Fisheries Resources, Idaho
Rivers United, Idaho Steelhead and Salmon United, Northwest Sportfishing Industry
Association, Friends of the Earth, Salmon for All, and Columbia Riverkeeper. Id.

211. Id.at *4-4.
212. Id. at *4 (citing 2000 BiOp, supranote 157, at 3-1).
213. Nat'l Wildlfe Fed'n, 2004 WL 1698050, at *4 (recognizing that the assumption of
a uniform release rate "was made by the agency despite the fact that the agreement with
Idaho Power Company did not require the water to be released at a uniform rate ... and
there was no rational basis to conclude that the water would be released in such a manner
given the pattern of releases in prior years"). Judge Redden opined that "the assumption
of uniform flow was made to accommodate the limits of the model used by NOAA ...
rather than to reflect real river conditions." Id
214. Id. at *5.

215. Id
216. Id at *6.
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The NWF v. NMFS II decision was noteworthy for
demonstrating Judge Redden's willingness to subject the federal
operating agencies' reasoning to exacting judicial scrutiny.
Moreover, the decision reflected the judge's mounting frustration
with NOAA's approval of actions that jeopardized listed salmon
species while maintaining or increasing power production.217
VI. JUDGE REDDEN'S SECOND REMAND: THE 2004 BIOP
On September 9, 2004, NOAA completed a draft revised BiOp,
and the action agencies filed a related implementation plan. 218
Judge Redden responded by scheduling a status conference for
September 28, 2004 to discuss those documents. 219 He explained
that his intent in reviewing the draft BiOp was "to ascertain
whether it is likely that the [g]overnment [wa]s headed for a train
wreck, and, if so, whether it [could] be avoided."2 2 0 On September
23, 2004, in preparation for the status conference, the judge issued
an order with preliminary observations and questions directed to
NOAA and the other federal action agencies.22 '
Earlier, in May 2004, Judge Redden had observed that NOAA
appeared to be advocating a new framework for making jeopardy
determinations.2 2 2 Now, in his September 23 order, the judge
217. See Practicing Deception, supra note 12, at 767 (claiming that Judge Redden's
decision "revealed [his] growing impatience with attempts by federal hydrosystem
managers to obfuscate the effects of [Federal Columbia River Power System] operations
on listed salmon species. The judge's observation that ESA implementation required more
than a simple 'numbers game' reflected his increasing skepticism of the claims of federal
dam operators and NOAA, who were willing to risk large numbers of listed salmon, while
professing to fulfill their ESA duty to avoid jeopardy through other actions that allegedly
compensated for the increased risk.").
218. Order at 2, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640RE (D. Or. Sept. 23,2004), ECF. No. 620.
219. Ad
220. Opinion & Order at 7, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
CV 01-640-RE (D. Or. Mar. 2, 2005), ECF No. 793.
221. Order at 1-2, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640RE (D. Or. Sept. 23,2004), ECF. No. 620.
222. Opinion & Order at 4, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
CV 01-640-RE (D. Or. May 13, 2004), ECF No. 496. According to Judge Redden, on May
13, 2004, "[i]t appear[ed] that [NOAA] has now proposed a new analytical framework to
determine whether [hydropower operations] pose[] jeopardy to listed salmon." Id. The
judge suggested topics of discussion related to the change in jeopardy framework. Id.
Further, he stated that "[t]he court is aware that (NOAA's] policies regarding the listing
of Northwest salmonids are in flux, including how fish raised in hatcheries are to be
considered when determining whether to list a species or Evolutionary Significant Unit. At
the next steering committee meeting, the court would like the parties to address the
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stated that although NOAA described its draft 2004 revised BiOp
as a new version of the 2000 BiOp, the agency's draft "differ [ed]
markedly from the 2000 BiOp in both its analytical approach and
its conclusions."223 In the same order, Judge Redden urged NOAA
to consider several issues for discussion at the status conference,
including whether the agency had used the remand period to
create a new BiOp and, if so, whether that was permissible; why the
agency failed to include a reasonable and prudent alternative even
after being directed to do so; and what scientific evidence
supported the agency's decision to establish a new concept of the
environmental, baseline that included the effects of the existence
of the dams. 224
After the status conference in late September 2004, NOAA
released a revised BiOp in November 2004 on an "updated
proposed action." 225 However, rather than being more protective
of salmon than the 2000 BiOp, the new 2004 BiOp concluded that
operation of the hydroelectric system in the Columbia River Basin
would not jeopardize listed salmon species or adversely modify
critical habitat. 226 NOAA's new no-jeopardy decision was based in
large part on its characterization of the environmental baseline
against which it compared proposed actions to determine whether
species would be adversely affected. 227
In the 2004 BiOp, designed to cover Columbia Basin
hydroelectric operations for ten years, NOAA adopted a novel way
to assess jeopardy.228 The new method of determining jeopardy
possible ramifications, if any, of such policy changes to this case, including any impact on
the listing status of Columbia River salmon and steelhead runs. Similarly, the court would
like the parties to address the status, substance, and ramifications for this case of rule
changes required by the Alsea decision." Id.
223. Order at 2, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640RE (D. Or. Sept. 23, 2004), ECF. No. 620.
224. Id. at 2-3. Judge Redden also stated that "[pilaintiffs, intervenors, states, Treaty
Tribes, and other amic cariaemay identify and describe their most serious five concerns
and e-mail them to the court, defendants, and other parties" by the morning of September
27, 2004-the day before the status conference. Id. at 4.
225. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION, CONSULTATION ON
REMAND FOR OPERATION OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND 19 BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA BASIN 1-3 (Nov. 30, 2004) [hereinafter 2004

BiOp].
226. Id. at 8-4.
227. See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640-RE,
CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1278878, at *7-8 (D. Or. May 26, 2005) (discussing NOAA's
establishment of an environmental baseline in the 2004 BiOp).
228. 2004 BiOp, supra note 225, at-1-9.
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defined the environmental baseline to include the effects of all
existing dam operations, on the apparent assumption that such
operations were beyond the agencies' control. 229 According to the
agency, "each of the dams already exist[ed], and their existence
[was] beyond the scope of the . . . discretion" of the federal

agencies. 230 NOAA distinguished between what it termed
discretionary and nondiscretionary elements of an action and
decided that action agencies were not required to consult on
nondiscretionary elements, such as the existence of preexisting
projects that were beyond their control. 231 NOAA then claimed
that most dam operations were nondiscretionary, and thus part of
the environmental baseline.23 2 In addition to largely excluding
existing operations from the jeopardy determination, NOAA
conflated recovery and survival and used a long-term balancing test
to predict that the species' critical habitat would not be adversely
affected.233 As with the earlier BiOps, environmentalists objected to
this preference for hydroelectric operations at the expense of the
recovery of listed salmon.
A. Rejecting the 2004 BiOp
In National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service

III (NWF v. NMFS III), numerous environmental and conservation
groups challenged NOAA's 2004 BiOp. 23 4 In May 2005, Judge
Redden upheld their challenge, rejecting NOAA's 2004 BiOp as
the "disappointing result" of his remand of the 2000 BiOp. 235
According to the judge, the 2004 BiOp "was a cynical and
transparent attempt to avoid responsibility for the decline of listed
Columbia and Snake River salmon and steelhead. NOAA wasted
several precious years interpreting and reinterpreting the ESA's
regulations." 236 Therefore, he rejected it.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 5-5.
231. Nat'1 Wildlife Fedn, 2005 WL 1278878, at *7-8.
232. Id. at *7.
233. Id. at *16-17.
at *1.
234. Id.
235. Opinion & Order at 18, Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV
01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1278878 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2005), ECF No. 1221. After
reviewing the 2004 BiOp, Judge Redden opined in December 2005: "We need a viable
biological opinion. The public demands and deserves no less." Id.
236. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1130
(D. Or. 2011).
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Judge Redden gave four reasons for finding the 2004 BiOp
inadequate.237 First, NOAA improperly segregated aspects of dam
operations that it claimed were nondiscretionary. Second, the
agency impermissibly limited its analysis to only the incremental
effects of proposed dam operations instead of considering the
aggregate effects of the operations and the dams themselves.
Third, NOAA's critical habitat determination was flawed because
the agency (1) failed to analyze the short-term negative effects of
the proposed action in the context of salmon life cycles and
migration patterns; (2) relied on long-term improvements to
critical habitat that were not certain in order to offset the shortterm degradation of critical habitat; and (3) determined that the
listed salmon species' critical habitat was sufficient for recovery,
even though the agency did not have information on in-river
survival rates sufficient to make that determination. Finally, NOAA
failed to separate survival from recovery in its analysis. 238
Judge Redden's reasoning on the first issue was that NOAA
could not avoid consultation "where there is some meaningful
discretionary involvement or control in the action." 2 9 He observed
that the federal action agencies had "considerable discretion" in
administering hydroelectric operations, including in decisions to
operate the dams to encourage the divergent interests of
hydroelectric power production, fish and wildlife protection, and
recreation. 24o The judge remarked that the ESA contains only a
single exemption for agencies where a statutory directive to
undertake a project leaves them with insufficient discretion to
avoid jeopardizing a listed species,24 1 but in its 2004 BiOp, NOAA
attempted to create a nonstatutory exemption. 242
237. Nat'L WildlifeFed'n, 2005 WL 1278878 at *7.
288. Id.Judge Redden declined to address other potential issues with the 2004 BiOp,
explaining that "[e]ach of the [four] issues is independently dispositive and, therefore, I
need not address other issues raised by the parties." Id.
239. Id at *8.
240. Id. at *10 ("The action agencies have considerable discretion in their
administration of the [hydroelectric] systems, allowing them to meet their mandates and
yet adjust operations to fulfill multiple purposes, even though there may be some conflict
among the purposes. Decisions in operating the [dams] to accommodate the divergent
interests involve choices and the exercise of discretion.").
241. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iv) (2012) (establishing an Endangered Species
Committee, popularly known as "the God Squad").
242. Nat' Wildlife Fed'n, 2005 WL 1278878, at *10-11 ("For the [existing ESA
exemption] to apply, the [Endangered Species] Committee must find, among other
things, that there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed action; the
proposed action is of regional or national significance; and the 'benefits of alternative
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Under NOAA's interpretation of what qualified as a
nondiscretionary element of an action, the agency did not need to
consider the existence of Columbia Basin dams because it decided
that some elements of the operation of those dams were
nondiscretionary. 243 However, Judge Redden determined that
operation of the dams included both discretionary and
nondiscretionary elements, concluding that the agency could not
be

"insulate [d]

. . . from

accountability

because

of the

nondiscretionary aspects of its proposed actions."2'4 He therefore
decided that NOAA's distinction between discretionary and
nondiscretionary elements was contrary to law. 245 He also observed
that the 2004 BiOp's position on nondiscretionary elements
departed from both its 1995 and 2000 BiOps, and that where an
agency's interpretation of a regulation conflicts with its previous
interpretations of a regulation, the new agency position is entitled
to only limited judicial deference. 246
Concerning the second issue, Judge Redden determined that
NOAA had impermissibly failed to consider the aggregate adverse
effects on salmon from all relevant sources. 247 The judge explained
that by employing a so-called "comparative approach," the 2004
BiOp removed the effects of some elements-the elements the
agency deemed nondiscretionary-from any consideration,
consigning those effects to the environmental baseline.24 8 The
result, according to Judge Redden, was that NOAA analyzed only
the incremental effects of its proposal standing alone, rather than
in conjunction with the cumulative effects of a deteriorated
environment, balancing the limited impact against beneficial
mitigation measures. 249 Thus, by basing the jeopardy decision only
on the effects of what it decided were discretionary elements of the
courses of action' that are 'consistent with preserving the species or its critical habitat' are

clearly outweighed by the benefits of the proposed action.").
243. Id.at*11.
244. Id. According to Judge Redden, "the action agencies ha[d] not contended that
'the sole cause' of salmon and steelhead decline is 'the existence of the dams and not any
discretionary method of operating' them." Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. ("I give only limited deference to NOAA's interpretation. When an agency's
new interpretation of a regulation conflicts with its earlier interpretations, the agency is
'entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently[] held agency view." (citing
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987))).
247. Nat'l WildhifeFed'n, 2005 WL 1278878, at *14.
248. Id. at *13.
249. I.
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proposed dam operations, NOAA "substantially lower[ed] the
threshold required for the mitigation elements of the proposed
action."250 Judge Redden concluded that NOAA's comparative
approach was unlawful because it fell short of the comprehensive
approach to jeopardy analysis required by the ESA.2 5 For a second
time, the judge noted that NOAA was entitled only to limited
deference because the agency had departed from its previous
interpretation of a regulation.252
On the third issue, Judge Redden rejected NOAA's claim that
the proposed hydroelectric operations would not adversely modify
or destroy designated critical habitat.25 3 The judge observed that
NOAA must separately consider whether a proposed action will
adversely affect both the survival and recovery of a listed species. 254
However, although NOAA acknowledged that critical habitat for
listed salmon was "poor" and likely to be degraded in the short
term and conceded that lowering spill rates would impair safe
passage downstream for juveniles in the short term, the agency
decided that the proposed action would not adversely modify
250. Id. at*14.

251. Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g); see supra notes 213-16
and accompanying text (describing the first time Judge Redden gave limited
administrative deference due to a change in position).
252. Nat'1 Wildhfe Fed'n, 2005 WL 1278878, at *14 ("The approach of the 2004BiOp
stands in sharp contrast to the aggregative approach NOAA used in prior BiOps, which
was comprehensive enough to ensure an adequate jeopardy analysis without being so rigid
as to foreclose consideration of non-quantifiable factors.").
253. Id. at*16.
254. Id. at *15; see also Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378
F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The agency's controlling regulation on critical habitat
thus offends the ESA because the ESA was enacted not merely to forestall the extinction of
species (i.e., promote a species survival), but to allow a species to recover to the point
where it may be delisted. The ESA also defines critical habitat as including 'the specific
areas . . . occupied by the species .

.

. which are .

.

. essential to the conservation of the

species' and the 'specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species ...
that ... are essential for the conservation of the species. . . .' By these definitions, it is clear

that Congress intended that conservation and survival be two different (though
complementary) goals of the ESA. Clearly, then, the purpose of establishing 'critical
habitat' is for the government to carve out territory that is not only necessary for the
species' survival but also essential for the species' recovery." (citations omitted)).
Judge Redden reported that NOAA's Consultation Handbook defined "recovery" as "the
process by which species' ecosystems are restored and/or threats to the species are
removed so self-sustaining and self-regulating populations of listed species can be
supported as persistent members of native biotic communities," and "survival" as "the
species' persistence . . . with sufficient resilience to allow recovery from endangerment.
Said another way, survival is the condition in which a species continued to exist into the
future while retaining the potential for recovery." Nat7'Wildhfe Fed'n, 2005 WL 1278878, at
*17.
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critical habitat.255 NOAA arrived at this apparently contradictory
conclusion by anticipating that short-term habitat degradation
would be offset by habitat improvements that its BiOp promised by
2014. 256 Judge Redden declined to follow NOAA's reasoning about
balancing habitat degradation with offsets over a period of years,
rather than in the short term.2 57 He concluded that such
"optimistic" balancing was "unrealistic," and therefore contrary to
the ESA. 25 8
On the fourth and final issue, Judge Redden concluded that
the 2004 BiOp was unlawful because, unlike the 1995 and 2000
BiOps, the 2004 BiOp did not include consideration of whether
the proposed hydroelectric operations would appreciably reduce
the likelihood of listed species' recovery.259 In contrast with the
earlier BiOps, the 2004 BiOp focused almost exclusively on the
extent to which the proposed dam operations would reduce the
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of the listed salmon. 2eo
Consequently, for a third time, Judge Redden gave only limited
deference to NOAA's interpretation in the 2004 BiOp that differed
significantly from its interpretations in previous BiOps, deciding
that the 2004 jeopardy analysis was impermissible because it failed
to address prospects for recovery of listed salmon species. 26 1 Thus,
the judge invalidated NOAA's 2004 BiOp. 262
NOAA appealed Judge Redden's holding that the 2004 BiOp
was arbitrary and capricious, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district courtjudge's opinion in all respects. 263
B. BPA's Attempt to Defund the FishPassage Center

The Northwest Power Act called for the protection and
restoration of Columbia Basin fish and wildlife-and salmon in
255. Nat'I Wildhfe Fed'n, 2005 WL 1278878, at *14-15.
256. Id. at *16.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at *17.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id at *3, *7.
263. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 938 (9th Cir.
2008) ("In short, after a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the
district court. Its rejection of the 2004 BiOp was entirely appropriate, and it did not abuse
its discretion in entering the remand order."). See ImposingjudicialRestraints, supra note
47, at 48, for further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision.
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particular-while assuring a reliable and affordable power supply
in plans promulgated by the Northwest Power and Conservation
Planning Council (Council),264 an interstate compact agency. 265
The Council's Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
established the Fish Passage Center (FPC) to collect and analyze
scientific information on Columbia Basin salmon migration and
survival.266
Despite its scientific focus, the FPC's studies proved
controversial when Judge Redden relied upon them in 2005 as an
influence on one of his spill decisions. 267 After Redden's initial
decision in June 2005 to require federal hydroelectric operators to
spill water over the Lower Snake River and McNary Dams during
the late spring and summer of 2005,268 the FPC issued a
preliminary study reporting that the court-ordered spill had
resulted in the highest levels of salmon survival recorded in recent
years.269 Judge Redden relied on the FPC's 2005 study when he
again required spill during the spring and summer of 2006.270
264. See 16 U.S.C. § 839 (stating that the purposes of the Northwest Power Act were
"to encourage, through the unique opportunity provided by the Federal Columbia River
Power System .

.

. conservation and efficiency in the use of electric power, and .

.

. the

development of renewable resources within the Pacific Northwest [and] to assure the
Pacific Northwest of an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power supply," as
well as "to protect, mitigate and enhance the fish and wildlife, including related spawning
grounds and habitat, of the Columbia River and its tributaries, particularly anadromous
fish which are of significant importance to the social and economic well-being of the
Pacific Northwest"); see also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 24, at 129-60 (discussing

passage of the Northwest Power Act).
265. See Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power & Conservation
Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1363-66 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that although
Congress gave the interstate compact Council some attributes of federal law, Council
members' appointments, salaries, and administrative options were pursuant to laws of four
individual states, and the states ultimately empowered Council members to carry out their
duties; thus, the appointments clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, did
not require that members be appointed by the President instead of state governors).
266. See Nw. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, MAINSTEM AMENDMENTS TO THE
COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, 27-28 (2003) [hereinafter
COUNCIL'S
2003
FISH
AND
WILDLIFE
PROGRAM],
available
at http://
www.nwcouncil.org/library/2003/2003-11.pdf (stating that the FPC "shall ... [p]lan and

implement" smolt monitoring and gather and analyze information related to fish
passage).
267. For a discussion of the controversial nature of the FPC's support for spill, see
PracticingDeception, supra note 12, at 729-30, 732-33.

268. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23RE, 2005 WL 1398223, at *5 (D. Or. June 10, 2005); see supra notes 204-17 and
accompanying text (discussingJudge Redden'sJune 2005 spill order).
269. See PracticingDeception, supranote 12, at 800.

270. Opinion & Order at 2, 16-17, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries
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As a result, in late 2005, Congress responded to the FPC's
support for spill by inserting language into a conference report
that aimed to eliminate funding for the FPC,20i suggesting that the
FPC should be defunded and its functions transferred to other
agencies.272 But the bill's language made no reference to the FPC
at all. 2 73 Nevertheless, a few weeks after the bill passed, BPA cited
the conference report language to justify soliciting replacement
agencies for the FPC,27 4 selecting Battelle Pacific Northwest
Laboratory and Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission to
replace the FPC in 2006.275
A group of environmentalists and conservationists, led by the
Northwest Environmental Defense Center, challenged BPA's
decision to transfer the functions of the FPC. 276 The plaintiffs
argued277 that the transfer was a violation of the agency's duty to
act consistent with the Council's Fish and Wildlife Program, which
called for continued operation of the FPC, and also that BPA's
withdrawal of funding for the FPC violated the Northwest Power
Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Dec. 29,2005), ECF No. 1221.
271. See S. REP. No. 109-84, at 178-79 (2005) ("The Committee is concerned about
the increasing cost of salmon recovery efforts in the Columbia River Basin, and about the
potential adverse impact of those increased costs on customers of the Bonneville Power
Administration. The Committee also is concerned about the quality and efficiency of some
of the fish data collection efforts and analyses being performed. As a result, during fiscal
year 2006, the [BPA] may make no new obligations from the [BPA] Fund in support of the
[FPC]. The Committee understands that there are universities in the Pacific Northwest
that already collect fish data for the region and are well-positioned to take on the
responsibilities now being performed by the [FPC].").
272. See H.R. REP. No. 109-275, at 174 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1065, 1125 ("The conferees call upon [BPA] and the [Council] to ensure
that an orderly transfer of the [FPC] functions ... occurs within 120 days of enactment of
this legislation. These functions shall be transferred to other existing and capable entities
in the region in a manner that ensures seamless continuity of activities.").
273. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-103,
119 Stat. 2247, 2276 (2005).
274. See BPA, INTEGRATED FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, PROGRAM SOLICITATIONavailable at http://www.efw.bpa.gov/
REQUEST FOR APPLICATIONS 1 (2005),
IntegratedFWP/RequestForApplications.pdf ("Congress passed legislation (House Report
109-275), which forbids BPA from making additional obligations in support of the
[FPC].").
275. Press Release, BPA, BPA Selects Successors to Fish Passage Center (Jan. 26, 2006) (on

file with BPA). Under the agency's proposed plan, Battelle would "oversee, coordinate,
and facilitate broader, nonroutine scientific analysis of that data, including independent
peer review" and Pacific States would "[m]anage the smolt monitoring program,"
"[p]erform functions associated with related data collection and management," and
"[c]onduct routine analysis and reporting of that data." Id.
276. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2007).
277. Id. at 677-78.
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Act, which requires BPA to use its funding to "protect, mitigate
and enhance fish and wildlife. . . in a manner consistent with" the
Fish and Wildlife Program. 278
In January 2007, the Ninth Circuit decided that BPA had
violated both the APA and Article I of the Constitution by
defunding the FPC.279 According to the Ninth Circuit, BPA
violated Article I of the Constitution by transferring the functions
of the FPC on the basis of mere legislative history.2' Further, the
court concluded that the agency had no rational basis for its
choice, and thus that it had acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in
violation of the APA. 28 1 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit granted
injunctive relief, requiring BPA to continue to fund the FPC "until
it ha[d] established a proper basis for displacing the FPC."28 2
Thus, this decision maintained an important source of
independent scientific information upon which Judge Redden
could rely. 283

278. 16 U.S.C. § 839(b)(h)(10) (A) (2012). Under the Northwest Power Act, the
Council must adopt a program to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife, which is
known as the Fish and Wildlife Program. § 839(b)(h)(1)(A) (2012). The statute requires
BPA to use its funding to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife "in a manner
consistent with . .. the program adopted by the Council." § 839(b) (h) (10) (A) (2012).
279. Nro. EnviL Def Cir., 477 F.3d at 691; see ImposingJudicialRestraints, supra note 47,

at 57-65 (discussing this decision).
280. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 477 F.3d at 682. "[C]ourts have no authority to enforce [a]
principl[e] gleaned solely from legislative history that has no statutory reference point."
Id at 683 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Shannon v. United States,
512 U.S. 573, 584 (1994)).
281. ImposingJudicialRestraints, supra note 47, at 91. The Ninth Circuit explained that
"the administrative record does not show that BPA ... considered the relevant facts and
used a rational process to decide to transfer the functions of the FPC to other entities.
Apart from the evidence in the record reflecting BPA's incorrect belief that it was required
to follow the congressional committee report language, there is no evidence showing how
BPA decided to transfer the functions of the FPC and to issue the December 8, 2005
Program Solicitation. This failure presents itself in high relief in light of the Council's
program calling for the continued operation of the FPC." Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 477 F.3d at
688.
282. Id at 691.
283. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640-RE, 2005 WL
3576843, at *8 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2005) (stating that an FPC study "showed that more spill
improved the survival rate of salmon passing the dams compared to previous years").
Despite BPA's attempts to defund it, the FPC still exists. See COUNCIL's 2003 FISH AND
WILDLFE PROGRAM, sufra note 266, at 27. The 2003 Mainstem Amendments to the Fish

and Wildlife Program, which are currently in force, expressly call for "the continued
operation of the Fish Passage Center." Id.
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C. Managingthe 2004 BiOp on Remand

After rejecting the 2004 BiOp, which was the fifth opinion
NOAA issued on federal hydroelectric operations in the Columbia
Basin, Judge Redden continued to oversee NOAA's efforts to
create a BiOp consistent with the ESA. 28 In December 2005,
worried about spill levels at several dams, environmental groups
filed a motion for injunctive relief to require the United States
Army Corps of Engineers to increase spill during salmon migration
28 5
periods, decrease reliance on transportation, and augment flow.
Judge Redden reviewed the Corps' proposed 2006 spill
program, noting that the Corps had adopted a "spread-the-risk"
policy, using spill and truck and barge transport in relatively equal
measures, because, according to the Corps, "[s]tudies do not
establish, with absolute certainty, the relative benefits of spill versus
transportation." 286 Giving deference to the agency's scientific
judgment, the judge approved its proposals for early spring spill
and summer spill.2 87 However, Judge Redden granted the
environmental groups' request for injunctive relief in part,
ordering important changes to two aspects of the Corps' proposed
2006 spill program. 2 8
The first change the judge ordered was to continue spill in the
289
late spring in the same manner as in the early spring. In what
Judge Redden described as a "radical departure from past
operations" not justified by the best science available to the Corps,
the agency proposed to eliminate all late spring spill at three of its
284. Nat'L Wildhife Fed'n, 2005 WL 1278878, at *1-3 (observing that he required
quarterly reports on NOAA's progress after remanding the 2004 BiOp).
285. Opinion & Order at 2, 4, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2005), ECF No. 1221. Plaintiffs sought "injunctive
relief requiring the Corps to increase spill to assist juvenile spring/summer chinook
salmon and steelhead migrating to the ocean during the spring. [Plaintiffs] also s[ought]
an order requiring the Corps to increase the amount of water in the river for a proposed
[] augmentation of flow, thereby creating a more natural river hydrograph for migrating
juveniles and decreasing their travel time to the ocean." Id. at 2-3. Judge Redden
summarized the parties' positions: "As to spill, the parties' dispute essentially involves the
extent to which the Corps intends to rely on transportation, rather than spill, during the
spring and summer seasons. To a lesser extent the parties disagree on the amount of spill
needed. The parties' dispute as to the augmented flow issue is more fundamental." Id. at
5.
286. Id. at 6.
287. Id. at 7, 10.
288. Id. at 11.
289. Id.
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dams and instead rely exclusively on collection and transportation
of juveniles during that time.290 The second change the judge
ordered was to continue spill through August 31, rather than
ceasing spill by August 15 if ninety-five percent of the salmon run
had passed the dam, and he also directed the Corps to examine its
reliance on transportation by truck during the remand period.29 '
Judge Redden ordered all the Columbia Basin hydropower
action agencies to provide him with a written report describing
implementation and progress of the spill program, beginning with
the first day of spring and summer spills and continuing every
thirty days thereafter. 292 Discussing the spill program the Corps
proposed for 2006, the judge observed that the FPC's count of fish
surviving the 2005 summer migration appeared to demonstrate
that increased spill improved the survival of salmon passing
dams.293 According to Redden:
The Fish Passage Center's expertise at gathering such useful data
must be replicated for the spring of 2006 and beyond. Only with
such data can the relative benefits of spill and/or transportation
be determined. The situation demands more certainty.2 94
However, the judge declined to order the agencies to augment
river flows, deciding that the option was not supported by the best
available science.295
Over a year after the 2006 spill decision, on April 10, 2007, the
court received an anonymous phone message asserting that at the
end of March and beginning of April BPA had intentionally
violated spill requirements to satisfy commitments to supply power
and then attempted to declare a system emergency to conceal the
290. Id. at 7-9.
291. I at 11.
292. Id.
293. Id, at 16.
294. Id. at 16-17.
295. Id. at 16. According to judge Redden, the plaintiffs have "failed to establish that
the best available science support[ed] [their] proposal for augmented flow during the
summer 2006 migration period." Id. The environmental groups subsequently opted not to
pursue injunctive relief governing the Corps' 2007 spill program because the federal
action agencies entered into an agreement with several treaty tribes for spring and
summer 2007, agreeing to continue the spill operations Judge Redden had ordered in
2006. Opinion & Order at 3, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 477 F.3d
668, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI, (9th Cir. May 23, 2007), ECF No. 1347. However, that
agreement proved insufficient to govern the agencies' spill program.
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variance.296 After overestimating and thus overselling power for
April 3, 2007-with the result that it could not provide the
promised power and meet its spill obligations-BPA violated fish
protection measures in an attempt to generate more power in
order to meet its commitments. 7 Concerned about this willful
violation of his decision, Judge Redden issued a May 23, 2007
order in which he stated: "Apparently, BPA's sales commitments to
customers always trump its obligations to protect ESA-listed
species. BPA must realize, however, that the fish-protection
measures detailed in the 2000 and 2004 BiOps are not optional.
Nor is compliance with the ESA." 298 The judge therefore
incorporated the terms of a 2007 agreement into a court order
outlining the parameters of the 2007 spill program..2 99 The
agencies did not object,300 and their spring and summer spill
programs during the next four years complied with the judge's
2007 order,30 a reflection of the success of Judge Redden's
oversight.
After his 2007 order, Judge Redden continued to work with
NOAA in the hope that the agency would arrive at a revised BiOp
that would satisfy the ESA. For example, on February 18, 2009, the
296. Opinion & Order at 2, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'1 Marine Fisheries Serv., 477
F.3d 668, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI, (9th Cir. May 23, 2007), ECF No. 1347.
297. Id. at 3-4.
298. Id.at5.
299. Id at 6-7. Judge Redden explained that his order "[wals not a product of anger,
but frustration. The ESA is the law of the land, and has been since it was signed into law by
President Richard Nixon in 1973. Its mandate is clear: federal agencies must 'afford first
priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered species.' It is clearly written
because the drafters sought desirable goals, and knew it would require some sacrifice to
save our nation's precipitously diminishing species. The duty of federal agencies under
ESA has been litigated, and reaffirmed in federal courts across the country. Proposed
amendments to the Act have repeatedly failed, and its regulations stand firm. We might as
well get it right." Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
300. Id at 6.
301. Order for 2011 Summer Operations, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. June 14, 2011), ECF No. 1852; Order for 2011
Spring Operations, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640SI (D. Or. Mar. 24, 2011), ECF No. 1843; Order for 2010 Summer Operations, Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. June 14, 2010),
ECF No. 1768; Federal Defendants' Notice of 2010 Spring Operations, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n
v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Mar. 31, 2010), ECF No. 1760;
Order for 2009 Summer Spill Operations, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries
Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. June 10, 2009), ECF No. 1702; Joint Order for 2009
Spring Operations, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640SI (D. Or. Apr. 10, 2009), ECF No. 1694; Order for 2008 Operations, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n
v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Feb. 25,2008), ECF No. 1423.
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judge issued a letter to the parties to guide an oral argument
scheduled for March 6, 2009 .3 The letter explained that Judge
Redden's goal was to structure oral argument to leave enough time
for a discussion of how to go forward if the 2008 BiOp failed
review.303 Having twice remanded NOAA's BiOp for hydropower
operations, the judge declared: "I have no desire to remand this
[BiOp] for yet another round of consultation. The revolving door
of consultation and litigation does little to help endangered
salmon and steelhead. Federal Defendants and the sovereigns have
worked very hard on this [BiOp], and it shows-we have come a
long way from the 2004 BiOp."a But Judge Redden identified
several unresolved issues, including: (1) the adequacy of NOAA's
"trending toward recovery" standard for determining jeopardy
under the ESA, (2) funding for estuary habitat improvements, and
(3) contingency plans in the event that proposed habitat
mitigation measures were not effective.305 On February 25, 2009,
the judge issued a second letter adding additional questions about
the proposed estuary habitat improvements and funding for
mitigation projects.306
After oral argument in March 2009, Judge Redden continued
to meet with the parties to encourage production of a lawful BiOp.
On May 18, 2009, after an April 2, 2009 meeting, he sent a letter to
the parties that provided his tentative position on the 2008

302. Letter to Parties at 1, Nat'1 Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Feb. 18, 2009), ECF No. 1682.
303. d at 2.
304. 1& at 2, 4, 5.
305. Id at 3-6. First, Redden questioned NOAA's "trending toward recovery"
jeopardy standard, instructing the parties to discuss the issue at oral argument and
providing several detailed questions. I at 3. The judge asked the agency, among other
things, whether it was entitled to deference when it had "ma[d]e no attempt to determine
what actual recovery means." Id. at 3. Judge Redden also asked whether NOAA's
determination that any positive growth in a species' population indicated that the species
was "trending toward recovery" meant that only incremental survival is sufficient to avoid
jeopardy. Id. at 3-4. Second, the judge expressed concern that NOAA relied on estuary
habitat improvements to arrive at a no-jeopardy finding but had failed to indicate how it
would secure funding for those improvements. IM at 4. The agency estimated that the
estuary habitat improvements would cost $500 million over twenty-five years, but Judge
Redden observed that the action agencies, including BPA, actually committed to spending
only $5.5 million for ten years-and much of that funding was dependent on
congressional approval. I& Third, Redden instructed NOAA to consider adding a
contingency plan to the 2008 BiOp in case the mitigation measures failed. Id. at 5-6.
306. Letter to Parties at 1-2, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Feb. 25, 2009), ECF No. 1683.
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BiOp, 7 stating that he had "serious reservations" about whether
NOAA's "trending toward recovery" standard complied with the
ESA.308 He proceeded to admonish NOAA, declaring that the
agencies "ha[d] spent the better part of the last decade treading
water, and avoiding their obligations under the [ESA]. Only
recently[] have they begun to commit the kind of financial and
political capital necessary to save these threatened and endangered
species, some of which are on the brink of extinction. We simply
cannot afford to waste another decade." 3 0
In September 2009, responding to the judge's concerns about
the 2008 BiOp, NOAA issued what it called an Adaptive
Management Implementation Plan (AMIP), which added estuary
restoration projects as well as research, monitoring, and
evaluation. 10 However, in preparation for a November 23, 2009
meeting, Judge Redden sent letters to the parties, expressing
concern that the AMIP, with its "unilateral, post decisional"
development of new mitigation actions, research, monitoring, and
evaluation, among other things, violated the "record review" rule
required by the APA. 31 ' The judge's November 2009 letters
encouraged NOAA to either persuade him that the AMIP was
properly before the court or take steps to incorporate the
document into the 2008 BiOp.312 On February 19, 2010, Judge
Redden granted NOAA's request for a remand to incorporate the
AMIP into the 2008 BiOp,3 13 and NOAA issued a supplemental
BiOp integrating the AMIP later in 2010.314

307. Letter to Parties at 1-4, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. May 18, 2009), ECF No. 1699.
308.

d at 1.

309.

d at 3.

310. FED. COLUMBIA RIVER POWER Sys., FCRPS ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, 2008-2018 FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM BIOLOGICAL
OPINION 10 (2009).

311. Letter to Parties at 1-2, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Nov. 18, 2009), ECF No. 1736; Letter to Parties at 1, Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Nat'Il Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Nov. 13, 2009), ECF No.
1735.
312. Letter to Parties at 2, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'Il Marine Fisheries Serv., Case
No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Nov. 13, 2009), ECF No. 1735.
313. Order Granting Vol. Remand at 2-3, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2010), ECF No. 1750.
314. Id

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2051638

138

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL

(Vol. 32:87

VII. JUDGE REDDEN'S THIRD REMAND: THE 2008/2010 BIOP

Despite Judge Redden's optimism about the 2008 BiOp, that
BiOp, even as amended in 2010 (2008/2010 BiOp), failed to
survive judicial scrutiny. In 2011 the judge again rejected the
agency's proposed plan for federal Columbia Basin hydropower
operations, remanding the agency's 2008/2010 BiOp.3 15
In National Wildlife Federation v. NationalMarine Fisheries Service

IV (NWF v. NMFS IV), numerous environmental groups challenged
NOAA's 2008/2010 BiOp.316 The environmental groups filed suit
on three grounds, alleging that (1) the "trending toward recovery"
jeopardy standard in the 2008/2010 BiOp was legally flawed; (2)
NOAA failed to use the best available scientific data to measure the
effects of hydropower operations and the benefits of proposed
reasonable and prudent alternatives; and (3) the BiOp relied on.
actions that were not reasonably certain to occur.3 17 Judge Redden
declined to address NOAA's jeopardy standard and scientific
methodologies, instead concluding only that the 2008/2010 BiOp
relied on mitigation plans that lacked specificity and were
unverifiable beyond 2013; therefore, NOAA relied on actions that
were not reasonably certain to occur.318
Judge Redden explained that the ESA prohibits NOAA from
relying on actions not reasonably certain to occur, and that an
agency may rely only on mitigation measures that "involve 'specific
and binding plans"' and "'a clear, definite commitment of
resources to implement those measures."' 319 The judge concluded
that in the 2008/2010 BiOp NOAA had relied on habitat
mitigation measures that were not specific or certain to occur, and
had not even identified some of those measures.320 That is,
although the BiOp authorized federal actions from 2008 to 2018,
the agency failed to identify any specific habitat projects after 2013,
315. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'I Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-00640-RE, 2011
WL 3322793, at *1-2 (D. Or. Aug. 2, 2011). See also Rohlf and Team Now Three for 77tree in
Protecting Salmon, EARTHRISE L. CrR., http://law.Iclark.edu/live/news/12828-rohlf-andteam-now-three-for-three-in-protecting (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
316. Natl Wildlhfe Fed'n, 2011 WL 3322793, at *5.
317. Id
318. AL at *6.
319. Id. (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'1 Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 93536 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the agency's "sincere general commitment to future
improvements" was insufficient to support its no jeopardy conclusion)); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02
(2009).
320. NaL'l Wildlife Fed'n, 2011 WL 3322793, at *6.
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instead assuming that it would later be able to identify and
implement appropriate projects. 3 2 ' NOAA defended its habitat
mitigation measures as being "reasonably certain to occur"
because the agency had committed to achieving specific,
numerical improvements in listed species' habitat quality and
survival. 322 However, after reviewing NOAA's projected
identification of projects, Judge Redden noted that unidentified
mitigation measures failed to meet the "reasonably certain to
occur" standard.323 Worse, the judge observed that NOAA
expected that the majority of mitigation measures it relied on to
make its no-jeopardy finding would not be identified an'd
implemented until at least 2013.324 The clear result was that when
NOAA seeks approval of a ten-year BiOp, it bears the burden of
identifying with specificity the mitigation measures necessary to
avoid jeopardy during that term.
Judge Redden proceeded to provide an unflattering summary
of the agency's position: "In other words, [NOAA] do[es] not
know what exactly will be needed to avoid jeopardy beyond 2013,
or whether those unknown actions are feasible and effective, but
the [agency] promise [s] to identify and implement something.
This is neither a reasonable, nor a prudent, course of action."3 25
He observed that the agency conceded that it could not identify
any specific projects expected to occur between 2013 and 2018.326
He also determined that, in addition to improper reliance on
habitat mitigation measures not reasonably certain to occur,
NOAA's estuary habitat mitigation program was "plagued with
uncertainty."32 7 According to the judge, the agency again relied on
survival improvements due to estuary habitat projects from
unidentified actions.328
321. Id at 1126 ("NOAA Fisheries relies on two types of habitat mitigation actions.
The first includes specific, identified projects scheduled to occur between 2008 and 2013.
The second, however, includes broad, unidentified categories of projects that Federal
Defendants intend to develop and implement between 2013 and 2018.").
322. Id at 1126.
323. Id.at 1127.
324. JdAat 1126.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id
328. Id at 1126-27 ("Apart from a vague process for identifying replacement estuary
projects if a particular action proves infeasible, there is no mechanism in the 2008 BiOp to
ensure that the action agencies will implement specific projects in the 2013 to 2018 time
frame or that 'equally effective' actions even exist.").
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Judge Redden concluded that, absent the benefits projected to
result from the unidentified mitigation measures, there was no
factual or rational basis for NOAA's no-jeopardy decision beyond
2013.32 Further, he remarked that not only were the mitigation
measures unidentified but, based on the agency's unfortunate
history of being unable to properly implement habitat
improvements, NOAA failed to show that the mitigation projects
were likely to materialize. 3 o The judge also observed that, in fact,
the 2010 supplemental BiOp showed that habitat mitigation was
already behind schedule, many habitat projects were delayed or
cancelled, and funding for additional or replacement projects was
potentially unavailable.331
Judge Redden therefore rejected NOAA's nojeopardy
decision, describing the agency's approach to mitigation measures
as "simply [a] promise to figure it all out in the future."332 That
approach, he stated, was "neither cautious nor rational."333 Thus,
he found the no-jeopardy decision for the entire ten-year term of
the 2008/2010 BiOp to be arbitrary and capricious,33 4 expressing
renewed concern about NOAA's approach to protecting listed
salmon species:
I continue to have serious reservations about NOAA['s]
habitat mitigation plans for the remainder of this BiOp. Everyone
agrees that habitat improvement is vital to recovery and may lead
to increased fish survival, but the lack of scientific support
for
335
NOAA['s] ... specific survival predictions is troubling.

Judge Redden also noted that NOAA's own scientists, as well as
independent scientists who reviewed the 2008/2010 BiOp, were
skeptical about the agency's survival predictions. 336
As he had done with both the 2000 and 2004 BiOps, the judge
329. M at 1127.
330. M at 1127, 1130.
331. Id at 1127.
332. Id. at 1128.
333. 1M
334. Id
335. M at 1129.
336. Id. at 1130 ("Although the [2008/2010] BiOp concludes that these specific
survival improvements are necessary to avoid jeopardy, NOAA Fisheries' own scientists, the
independent scientists who reviewed the 2008 BiOp, and the Independent Scientific
Advisory Board . . . have expressed skepticism about whether those benefits will be
realized.").
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remanded the 2008/2010 BiOp to NOAA for reconsideration but
left the unlawful BiOp in place pending replacement.337 However,
because he concluded that the 2008/2010 BiOp provided some
protection for listed species through 2013, he ordered NOAA to
fund and implement the BiOp until then. 33 In so doing, Judge
Redden explained, he was furthering protection of listed species,
because vacating the 2008/2010 BiOp would remove beneficial
measures that provided salmon with some minimal protection.339
The judge instructed NOAA to produce a new BiOp on Columbia
Basin hydroelectric operations no later than January 1, 2014.340
Notably, in this, his final review of a hydropower BiOp, the judge
acknowledged incremental improvements without foreclosing the
possibility of more aggressive action, such as dam removal, flow
augmentation, and reservoir modification.34 1
After rejecting yet another BiOp, Judge Redden once again
retained jurisdiction, explaining that NOAA had a "history of
abruptly changing course, abandoning previous BiOps, and failing
to follow through with [its] commitments to hydropower
modifications proven to increase survival (such as spill)."342 Based
on the survival benefits associated with spill and NOAA's "history
337. Id. at 1131.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1128-29 (explaining that "[wihen a biological opinion is unlawful, the
ordinary remedy is to vacate and remand the BiOp to the action agencies for immediate
reinitiation of consultation," but that vacating the 2008/2010 BiOp "would be disastrous
for the listed species").
340. Id. at 1130.Judge Redden ordered that "[n]o later than January 1, 2014, NOAA
Fisheries shall produce a new biological opinion that reevaluates the efficacy of the
[reasonable and prudent alternatives] in avoiding jeopardy, identifies reasonably specific
mitigation plans for the life of the biological opinion, and considers whether more
aggressive action, such as dam removal and/or additional flow augmentation and reservoir
modifications are necessary to avoid jeopardy." Id.
341. Id. at 1129-30; see also Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and
Salmon Simultaneously: The Biological, Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower Snake
River Dams, Lorneringjohn Day Reservoir, and RestoringNatural River Rows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997
(1998) [hereinafter Saving Snake River Water and Salmon]. As the Harvard Law Review

recently observed, "[t]he Columbia River conflict is only the most high-profile
manifestation of a growing unease about the environmental and economic costs of dams:
241 dams were demolished nationwide between 2006 and 2010." Environmental LawEndangered Species Act--District of Oregon Invalidates Biological Opinion for Federally Operated

Dams on Columbia River-National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service,
No. CV 01-00640-RE, 2011 WL 3322793 (D. OR Aug. 2, 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 819, 819
(2012); see also Michael C. Blumm & Andrew B. Erickson, Dam Removal in the Phaftic
Northwest: Lessons for the Nation, 43 ENvTL. L.

(forthcoming 2012),

available at

http://ssmn.com/abstract = 2101448.
342. Nat'l Wildlfe Fed'n, 2011 WL 3322793, at *11.
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of attempting to curtail spill without adequate justification," Judge
Redden also continued to order NOAA's allies, BPA and the
Corps, to maintain summer spill.3 45
In October 2011, the federal agencies appealed Judge
Redden's rejection of the 2008/2010 BiOp. However, in response
to the agencies' motion for voluntary dismissal, the Ninth Circuit
dismissed the appeal in April 2012.344
VIII. THE RESULTS OFJUDGE REDDEN'S MANAGEMENT ON
REMAND
In his review of the 2000, 2004, and 2008/2010 hydropower
BiOps and his fashioning of remedies intended to protect listed
salmon,345 Judge Redden demonstrated a commitment to ensuring
compliance with the ESA. As he stated in February 2009 and in
2011 in his final opinion in this case, his purpose in following the
BiOps on remand was to help NOAA arrive at a lawful BiOp and,
by doing so, prevent the extinction of listed salmonids and avoid
future litigation.346 He thus shepherded the revision of the BiOps
on remand, encouraging the agenc'y to make concrete progress
that would avoid more litigation.347 Unfortunately, absent close
judicial scrutiny, NOAA had little incentive to change status quo
operations by making the BiOps more protective of salmon, since
status quo federal hydroelectric operations benefitted powerful
economic interests.348 Further, NOAA and the other federal action
343. Id at 1131.
344. Order, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'1 Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI
(9th Cir. Apr. 16,2012), ECF No. 1890.
345. For a review of Judge Redden's involvement with the hydropower BiOps, see
Parts V.B, VI.C, and VII.
346. See generally Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 0100640-RE, 2011 WL 3322793, at *3-4 (D. Or. Aug. 2, 2011); Letter to Parties, Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Feb. 18, 2009), ECF No.
1682 ("I have no desire to remand this [BiOp] for yet another round of consultation. The
revolving door of consultation and litigation does little to help endangered salmon and
steelhead.").
347. See supra Parts V.B, V.C, VII. As Justice William Wayne of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas has opined: "[L]itigation is a poor
alternative to capable and caring performance by the state officials in the first instance.
But [in some instances] litigation may be the only way to bring justice to the continuously
expanding number of victims of the state's malfeasance." Wayne, supra note 101, at 12.
348. See supra note 20 for examples of powerful groups that have intervened on
behalf of NOAA, supporting the agency's hydropower BiOps. Professor Resnik has
explained that "[t]he issues in public law cases are complex and often depressing. Third
parties may impede implementation efforts, and fiscal constraints may limit defendants'
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agencies are not only resistant to change but also quite aware that
a reviewing court is unlikely to reject a BiOp outright, thus
exposing them to liability for take of listed species.? 9 In any event,
as discussed above, regardless of concern for repercussions to the
agencies, enjoining a BiOp that contains at least some protections
for listed species may be more detrimental than leaving an
unlawful BiOp in place.
Judge Redden accomplished several important feats by
managing NOAA's BiOps on remand. For example, by working
closely with the parties to manage all of the failed BiOps on
remand, the judge fostered a tone of collaboration. 3 w Judge
Redden's role in encouraging such collaboration was critical since,
according to one knowledgeable participant, "without the
establishment of judge-imposed ground rules, initial rounds of
negotiations have minimal chance of success, primarily because
most of the solutions involve changes to a well-entrenched status
quo." 35 Instead of bowing to the status quo, Judge Redden
required accountability for the protection of listed salmon,
regardless of pressures from powerful industry groups, by
maintaining court involvement throughout the BiOp process.
The judge first ordered quarterly status reports on June 2,
2003, after striking down the 2000 BiOp, 352 and he continued to
require the reports, as well as hearings on the reports, through
preparation of a 2008/2010 BiOp. 53 While NOAA was revising the
BiOp on remand, Judge Redden's requirement that the agency
provide quarterly reports, as well as his participation in conference
meetings and issuance of documents guiding the agency, brought
transparency to the process of assessing the effects of hydropower
flexibility to respond promptly to court decrees. Thus, even if personally sympathetic to
plaintiffs' claims, and even if angered by defendants' disobedience, judges find it politic
and appropriate to exercise restraint." Resnik, supra note 92, at 413.
349. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of vacating BiOps.
350. See, eg., supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text. As Professor Richard
Marcus has explained, status conferences set the tone of relationships between judges and
parties. Richard L. Marcus, Reining in the American Litigator. The New Role of Americanjudges,

27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 3, 18-19 (2003) (quoting Robert F. Peckham, The
Federaljudge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69

CALIF. L. REV. 770, 782 (1981)).
351. Timothy Weaver, Litigation and Negotiation: The History of Salmon in the Columbia

River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677, 687 (1997).
352. Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at 2, Nat'1 Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l
Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. June 2, 2003),
ECF No. 406.
353. See supra notes 195-203, 284, and accompanying text.
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on listed salmon. Moreover, the judge ensured that he acquired an
objective, third-party perspective on the complex scientific aspects
of the case by retaining the "eminently qualified" Dr. Howard
Horton as a technical advisor. 5 4
Even though agency decision making theoretically is a product
of considering the perspectives and interests of all affected
participants, interest-group pressure may cause agencies to
discount the weight of certain interests855-like those concerned
about the restoration of Columbia Basin salmon runs-relative to
others, such as the economic power of Columbia Basin
hydroelectric operations. Thus, public participation in agency
decision making may -be critical to a fair balance between
contending interests. Although the ESA provides no right to public
comment in section 7 consultation procedures,3 56 the quarterly
status reports Judge Redden ordered had the beneficial effect of
forcing NOAA to respond to concerns raised by both the plaintiffs
and the court, essentially permitting a limited kind of public
involvement.
Where a party has demonstrated protracted resistance to
change3 7-as is certainly the case in the Columbia Basin salmon
354. Opinion & Order at 8-9, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254
F. Supp. 2d 1196, No. 3:01-cv-00640-SI (D. Or. Mar. 2, 2005), ECF No. 793. According to
Judge Haggerty, "[iut is well known that cases brought under the ESA can involve complex
technical and scientific matters. Judge Redden has called upon Dr. Horton for the type of
advice he has rendered to other judges, including Judges Graid, Marsh, and King. Dr.
Horton has been providing technical and scientific service to courts for more than 20
years, and his training, experiences, and involvement in cases such as this evidence that he
is eminently qualified to serve as [Judge Redden's] techpical advisor." Id. at 8.
355. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 107, at 282-83 ("During the 1960s, numerous
observers with different political perspectives increasingly criticized the agencies. They
claimed that agencies were 'captured' by the very interests they were supposed to regulate,
that agencies failed to achieve the goals for which they were established, and that agencies
were ineffective or unresponsive. Many courts, writers, and critics came to perceive
considerable agency decisionmaking as an essentially legislative process in which the
perspectives of all affected individuals and interests were evaluated in making a decision.
That understanding was rendered problematic, however, because the interests of many
persons and entities were not advocated, much less considered. Judges responded by
relaxing restrictions on public participation in administrative processes and courtroom
litigation and by rigorously analyzing agency decisionmaking." (footnotes omitted)).
356. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 660 n.6
(2007); Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; Final
Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,928 (June 3, 1986) ("Nothing in section 7 authorizes or
requires the Service to provide for public involvement (other than that of the applicant) in
the 'interagency' consultation process.").
357. See Wayne, supra note 101, at 7 ("I firmly believe that when a defendant exhibits
a stubborn and perverse resistance to change, extensive court-ordered relief is both
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saga 358 -and a public interest case is complex, continuing judicial
supervision is justified.35 9 In this case, after receiving a third BiOp
that he deemed incapable of ensuring the survival of listed salmon,
Judge Redden indicated frustration, referring to aspects of the
2008/2010 BiOp as "troubling"36 and "neither cautious nor
rational." 3 6 His disappointment seemed almost an echo of his
earlier reflection that the balance of habitat degradation and
offsets in the 2004 BiOp was "unrealistic,"3 62 and that the BiOp
itself was merely the "disappointing result" of remand of the 2000
BiOp. 36 3 In turn, Judge Redden's statements about the 2004 and
2008/2010 BiOps were a continuation of Judge Marsh's opinion
that the situation of dam operations "literally cries out for a major
overhaul." 64 Regrettably, NOAA has yet to make the headway in
protecting listed salmon species that both judges called for, and
that failure now brings a third federal districtjudge into the role of
ensuring that the agency's BiOps comply with the ESA. Continued
close judicial oversight seems necessary if the federal Columbia
River hydroelectric system is to operate in a manner consistent
with the ESA's goal of recovering listed salmon.
IX. CONCLUSION
Judge Redden's oversight of the Columbia Basin saga is a
quintessential example of the managerial judging paradigm
advanced by Professors Chayes and Resnik. 365 Instead of taking an
active role in fashioning remedies, he might have merely declared

necessary and proper.").
358. See generally PracticingDeception, supra note 12.

359. See also Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 112, at 494 (remarking that
"intransigence and the complex nature of the institutions involved [may] make detailed
decrees and some level of supervision inevitable").
360. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
365. See Chayes, supra note 19; Resnik, supra note 92. As Bill Sedivy, Executive
Director of Idaho Rivers United, has stated: "'Judge Redden has done more for wild
salmon than three presidents, five federal agencies and 10 Congresses combined. . .. By
demanding that federal salmon managers follow sound science and the law, he has been a
tremendous force in slowing the extinction of wild salmon in Idaho and the Northwest.'"
Aaron Kunz, Judge Redden to Step Away from Columbia Salmon, Hydro Case, OR. PUB. BROAD.,

Nov. 23, 2011, http://earthfix.opb.org/water/article/judge-redden-to-step-away-fromcolumbia-salmon-hyd/.
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that the federal BiOps on federal Columbia Basin hydroelectric
operations failed to satisfy the ESA and let NOAA and the federal
action agencies figure out how to comply with the statute. But,
possibly because he let stand parts of the BiOps, particularly the
incidental take authorizations, 66 he took responsibility for giving
structure to the agency's approach to the remand periods.
Holding conferences with counsel,367 writing frequent letters
concerning issues he wanted the BiOps to address,368 requiring
agency implementation reports on a quarterly basis, 69 and
directing studies on the spill program he ordered, 70 Judge
Redden was an active participant in overseeing agency ESA
implementation. He also established several institutional
innovations, such as an attorneys' steering committee, which
allowed him to frame specific questions to the agencies and helped
to shed public light on the otherwise closed proceedings. 71
Further, Judge Redden made significant use of a science advisor to
help him understand the scientific complexities of the case and
delve deeply into potential remedies.372
To move the parties toward resolution, Judge Redden gave
specific instructions during a steering committee hearing about
issues that the agencies needed to confront during the remand of
the 2000 BiOp;37 3 he provided an early indication of the infirmities
of the 2004 BiOp during a status conference; 74 he identified issues
in advance on which he wanted oral argument on the 2008 BiOp
to focus; 75 and he suggested in one of his letters that the 2010
"adaptive management implementation plan" amendments to the
2008 BiOp had APA problems. 7 6 In all of these situations, he was
acting as a managerial judge, shaping the parties' responses to his
opinions and attempting to preempt future litigation-as well as

366. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., supra notes 302-09 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 352-53 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 354 and accompanying text. Dr. Horton's technical advice
assisted Judge Redden with many aspects of his decisions, including his orders to continue
spill.
373. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
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the extinction of Columbia Basin salmonids-by helping the
parties arrive at solutions.
Judge Redden's managerial judging was not the only
remarkable aspect of his Columbia Basin salmon oversight.
Perhaps because he retained jurisdiction over the case for over a
decade, the judge developed a healthy skepticism concerning the
federal agencies' focus on affecting hydroelectric operations only
minimally. Like his predecessor, Judge Marsh, who questioned the
agencies' willingness to risk species jeopardy,377 Judge Redden was
unimpressed with the agencies' attempts to buy off plaintiffs and
deflect attention from their unwillingness to significantly change
dam operations through elaborate habitat restoration plans.37 8
Unlike Judge Marsh, however, he would not defer to their claimed
expertise, so he ultimately rejected three consecutive BiOps.3 79
Although Judge Redden avoided reaching some. issues-notably
NOAA's claim that it could satisfy the ESA's nojeopardy directive
if hydropower
operations
merely
"trend [ed]
toward
recovery" 380-in his remand of the 2008/2010 BiOp, he refused to
allow the agency to approve a ten-year plan based largely on
nonspecific good intentions and a tenuous link between habitat
restoration efforts and salmon survival improvements.3' Thus,
although the judge's successor will no doubt have to confront
some of the issues thatJudge Redden avoided, he will also have the
benefit of following on the heels of Redden's careful rejections of
the 2000, 2004, and 2008/2010 BiOps.
After retiring, Judge Redden, somewhat surprisingly, indicated
that he thought the most effective means of restoring Columbia
Basin salmon would be to remove the four Corps of Engineers'
dams on the lower Snake River, which is the Columbia's principal
tributary. 82 The alternative of removing the lower Snake dams has
been widely considered for at least fifteen years,"3 but that option

377. See supra notes 134-56 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
379. See supra Parts V, VI, VII for discussions ofJudge Redden's three remands.
380. See supra note 305 and accompanying.text.
381. See supra notes 315-44 and accompanying text. One of us has suggested that the
federal agencies' "good intentions" are more accurately described as deceptive practices.
See PracticingDeception, supranote 12, at 806-09.

382. See supra note 5 forJudge Redden's 2012 statement about removing the dams.
383. See SavingSnake River Water and Salmon, supra note 341 (advocating breaching of
the lower Snake River dams in 1998).
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faces considerable political opposition.? Still, endorsement of
dam removal by the most prominent independent reviewer of the
Columbia River salmon saga gives hope that this long-running and
contentious dispute may one day reach a satisfactory resolution
that restores the Northwest's signature natural resource.
At the end of the day, however, we are left with disquieting
questions about the limited capacity of judicial oversight-even
from a judge committed to managerial judging, and one willing to
give close scrutiny to agency allegations of expertise in an
exceedingly complex problem-to effect real change to benefit
ESA-listed species. For nearly a decade, Judge Redden consistently
told NOAA and action agencies like BPA and the Corps that they
were violating the ESA, and he used the remand periods to
structure their responses to his opinions. But although he called
for significant changes in the operation of the federal Columbia
Basin hydroelectric system, apart from requiring a spill program to
facilitate salmon passage at the dams, 85 he never ordered specific
operational changes. Today, status quo dam operations largely
continue to inflict high salmon mortalities, and they do so over two
decades after a determination that more than a dozen species of
Pacific salmonids require ESA protection.
The Columbia Basin salmon saga is perhaps a paradigmatic
example of the limits of judicial review to effectuate real
improvements in complex natural resources cases where
administrative agencies are committed opponents of that change.
It may be that the deception agencies like NOAA and BPA have
practiced for so long is simply more powerful than a reviewing
judge-even one who sees behind the deception. Years ofjudicial
oversight convinced Judge Redden that the solution to the
problem of most of the imperiled salmon runs was removal of the
four federal dams on the lower Snake River, which some studies
have concluded is both an ecological and economically affordable
solution.38 But neither Judge Redden nor his successor has the
384. See, e.g., id at 1011 (stating that the alternative of breaching the dams "faces
considerable political skepticism").
385. See supra notes 204-17 and accompanying text.
386. For example, the Fish Passage Center has noted that Snake River salmon runs
maintained themselves between 1958 and 1968, but that after construction of the lower
Snake dams and the John Day Reservoir, they were no longer sustainable. See STATE OF
IDAHO, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, ENDANGERED SNAKE RIVER SPRING & SUMMER CHINOOK
SALMON-CAUSES AND EFFECTs 6 (1994) (quoting M. DEHART, RECOVERY TEAM
DISCUSSIONS OF ADEQUATE MIGRATION CONDITIONS, MEMORANDUM TO THE FISH PASSAGE
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authority to order removal of those congressionally authorized
dams. Only Congress can do that. And given the long odds of
congressional intervention, we may be left with many more years of
ESA litigation in which the federal agencies operating the largest
interconnected system of dams in the world continue an expensive
charade of pretending to be serious about restoring Columbia
Basin salmon while maintaining hydropower dominance. The
result of that stalemate may very well be the extinction of some
species of listed salmonids, which is obviously irreparable. This
disturbing reality is what Judge Redden's successor will soon
confront.m7

ADVISORY COMMiTrEE (1992)); see also Saving Snake River Water and Salmon, supra note 341,

at 1012-23 (collecting ecological studies), 1023-31 (collecting economic studies).
387. See supra note 10. NOAA's next BiOp is due "[n]o later thanJanuary 1, 2014."
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-00640-RE, 2011 WL
3322793, at *10 (D. Or. Aug. 2, 2011).
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